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PREFACE 
Problem identification and solving in the realm of political 
conflict requires that each actor respond by using his or her own pre-
scribed set of values. There are legal requirements that determine, to 
a degree, the extent to which these values may be implemented. These 
requirements may be general in their scope or particular in their 
application to a given circumstance. Such a specific application may be 
noted in the case of the laws dealing with elections in the state of 
Illinois. 
In Illinois, if you are a citizen; if you meet age and residency 
requirements; if you are registered; if you are in the vicinity of your 
precinct polling place on election day; you may vote in a primary and/or 
general. election. 1 On the presumption that a major goal of a political 
party is to elect its members to public office,2 ·one would be safe in 
assuming that it would be to the advantage of the political parties in 
the state to ensure the fulfillment of all of these 11 ifs. 11 
Over the years, students of politics have developed numerous 
ways to measure attempts to fulfill these requisities. Eligibility and 
registration statistics and voting indices are available and they can be 
1
state of Illinois Election Laws, October 22, 1973, Sections: 
3.:.1; 7-43 
2Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harper, 1957) 
iii 
evaluated by both simple and elaborate techniques. The analysis of this 
type of data has spawned questions which have been dealt with, to some 
degree of satisfaction, by political analysts (i.e., voting patterns in 
terms of education levels, SES, race, religion, and ethnic background). 
To my knowledge, there has been no effort to evaluate the apparently 
deliberate attempt to fragment a specific element of a definable urban 
community and thus prevent it from developing a cohesive voting bloc that 
could presumably rival the existing power structure. At its base, this 
would appear to be the nature of the study at hand. But what I intend 
to review involves deeper questions; questions of legality and misuse of 
public trust as a result of the phenomenon known as 11 gerrymandering. 11 
The immediate concern of this study is political power in rela-
tion to electoral representation of the Spanish-speaking and black 
minorities in Chicago. The approach involves a consideration of the 
redistricting ordinance that was adopted by the Chicago City Council on 
Novenber 5th, 1973,3 and what effect this ordinance had on the wards' 
populations and subsequently the nature of the electorate. 
The consequences of a political action that affect the individ-
uals in a given community in reference to their elected officials may be 
viewed from two distinct perspectives. The action may be examined in 
terms of the effect on the individual ward (in relation to the potential 
for democratic elections), and also may be examined in reference to the 
effect on the city as a whole (given that the individual ward is part of 
3Chicago Municipal Code, Section: 4, pars. 12-64 
iv 
the governing structure of the city). While the city is certainly more 
than the sum of the fifty wards, it must be noted that within the govern-
ing structure, each individual ward has a function to serve insofar as 
it is as equally represented by an alderman as any and all of the remain-
ing wards. In this sense, any ward that is gerrymandered affects the 
equality of representation on the entire City Council. 
Obviously, any connection between a single gerrymandered ward 
and the assumption that the city as a whole has suffered from undemo-
cratic practices would be a tenuous one at best. For that matter, two, 
three, or even five wards would not necessarily prove a correlation. 
However, in the event that the effect of a single incidence of gerry-
mandering did indeed affect the surrounding wards adversely, one could 
begin to establish a correlation. Furthermore, if this relationship 
between the gerrymandered ward and its surrounding wards were to affect 
the nature of the leadership in the city (by increasing the opportunity 
for an individual or party to win the election), a possible conclusion 
might be that the ability to gerrymander may have great influence on the 
continued election of certain members of the existing power structure. 
In the text of this analysis I will establish that certain wards 
were gerrymandered. I will further establish the relationship between 
this action and those who control the apparatus for redistricting. While 
the intentions of those actors involved in the gerrymandering can only 
be imputed, the function served by the action itself can be examined. 
Whether or not a correlation between gerrymandering and the con-
tinued existence of the machine can be ·established is perhaps best left 
v 
to history, but for the moment the objective is to replace as many of 
these 11 ifs 11 as possible with actual data. There would appear to be five 
major concerns that should be approached in order to accomplish this: 
First, the problem must be defined along with its ramifications. Second, 
gerrymandering will be placed in its historical perspective. From this 
point, the third approach will be a study of gerrymandering in its 
political context, that is, Chicago. Fourth, the consequences of the 
action of gerrymandering and their relationship with the political power 
structure in Chicago will be explicated. The fifth and final step will 
be to draw any possible conclusions from the establishment of this 
rel at ions hip. 
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Urban analysis may at times become a tedious endeavor unless one 
is able to define its parameters. Because this analysis involves a 
definite political structure as well as what may prove to be the result 
of informal policy, both the structure (the Democratic Party and its 
relationship with Chicago city government) and the policy (gerrymandering) 
must be defined and placed within the context of the question at hand. 
That is,to say, when examining gerrymandering in Chicago, the role of 
political 11 machine 11 and governmental development in the city as well as 
any prior history of gerrymandering become essential to defining the 
parameters of the struggle between the machine and the rights of the 
minority. 
Attempting to identify all the actors in this conflict, at least 
individually, would have questionable value. Despite the understanding 
that the 11 machine 11 in Chicago is not entirely monolithic--that it is 
comprised of several interests which play a definite role in this 
struggle--it becomes necessary to refer to the Democratic Party as an 
approxi ma ti on of a single entity. Edward C. Banfield gives reason to 
this in his description of the 11 machine 11 in Chicago and its 11 boss: 11 
..• (a machine is a party of a particular kind; one which relies 
characteristically upon attraction of material rewards rather than 
enthusiasm for political principles) ... As party 'boss', the mayor 
plays the principle part in making up the lticket 1 • One who defies 
1 
2 
his control may be 'dumped' at the next primary, and one who is 
loyal to him may be chosen for rapid advancement. In addition, he 
has a vast amount of patronage at his disposal; he can give or with-
hold the hundreds of jobs without which most ward committeemen could 
not maintain their positions. Without being dishonest himself, he 
can regulate the 'take' of those who profit from their connection 
with politics. Having control of the police force, he can decide 
how rigorously laws are to be enforced.I 
In more precise terms, 11 machine 11 refers to that political party 
with a virtual monopoly over political resources which distributes 
tangible incentives in exchange for votes.2 It is bureaucratic in 
structure with a clearly defined hierarchy. Like any other bureaucracy, 
self-maintenance is very high on its list of priorities.3 Yet, despite 
strong resistance from regular party 11 bosses, 11 the twentieth century in 
the United States has been marked by an end to the one-party rule of its 
big cities (City of Chicago excepted). 
The question of governmental development in terms of the demise 
of the machine and the rise of reform has been well studied from the 
social science perspective. There have been four major theories con-
cerning governmental development in urban America. The 11 conventional 
wisdom" of the field, which may be described as Assimilation Theory, 
includes the writings of Edward Banfield4 and Robert Dahl.5 They trace 
lEdward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free 
Press, 1961) p. 237 
2Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: 
Random House, 1966) p. 115 
3Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 
1962} p. 189 
4Banfield, Political Influence p. 237 
5Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1961) 
-3 
governmental development in terms of demographic changes that dialecti-
cally lead to the destruction of the machine. 
When Robert Dahl did his study of New Haven, it was viewed by 
many in the academic community as an accurate study of democracy and 
power in an American city. It was hailed by many as a 11 classic 11 study 
of pluralist theory of local power structure. 
The study expresses the view that governmental development is a 
function of demographic changes. That is to say, the changes in the 
social composition of the electorate (e.g. SES, education, ethnicity) 
produce_ a measurable change in the nature of government. "Accompanying 
and probably causing this (demographic) change ... appears to be a pro-
found alteration in the way political resources are distributed .•. 116 
Dahl goes on to say that the main evidence " ... for the shift from oligar-
chy to pluralism is found in changes in the social characteristics of 
elected officials ... 117 
For Banfield,8 increasing wealth, upward mobility, and the loss 
of ethnic i denti fi ca ti on with machine can di dates are the keys to the 
eventual destruction of the machine 1n Chicago. These factors were to 
precipitate a "good government" consciousness that would lead the machine 
to reform itself, or the voters to eventually 11 vote the rascals out." 
Coupled with the movement towards the suburbs, only a small electorate was 
6Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1961) p. 11 
7rbid. 
Bsanfield, Political Influence (See especially Chapter VIII for 
ensuing argument.) 
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to be left in the inner city machine heartland, causing a loss of the 
machine's voter base. And yet, nearly fifteen years after Banfield's 
study, on November 5, 1974 and again on February 25, 1975, the candidates 
slated by Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Democratic machine won over-
whelming victories. 
While this cursory recounting of the main elements of Assimila-
tion Theory (or for that matter any of the other theories that are to 
follow) does not begin to do it justice, the main intention here is to 
acknowledge the existence of these theories and to suggest an alternative 
theory that may well explain a significant portion of the success of the 
machine in Chicago. 
The second theory that seeks to explain why reform occurs can 
best be labeled the "muckraker theory." Held most widely by political 
journalists (in Chicago, Mike Royko of the Chicago Daily News is a prime 
example9), the process involves a "picking off" of the top leadership of 
the machine through investigation of their activities. Often times the 
process involves the combined efforts of a journalist and a civic-minded 
organization (such as the Better Government Association in Chicago). 
Through investigative reporting, a journalist can uncover 
questionable activities on the part of the leaders of the machine. If 
sufficient incriminating evidence is found, national, state or county 
prosecutori al staffs may investigate through a grand jury indictment. 
Once the main members of the machine have been eliminated through prosecu-
9Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The 
New Arre ri can Library, 1971) 
tion and conviction, the machine's structure would crumble. This 
approach to reform was believed to be the reason for the fall of the 
political "bosses" in Kansas City and Boston.10 
5 
The third main theory, most highly represented by James Q. Wilson, 
suggests that reform stems from an internal struggle for power that grows 
out of the development of "competitive parties. 11 11 According to Wilson, 
reform occurs when reform clubs within the party develop and create 
competition for resources. Perhaps the most classic example of this was 
the ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall in New York in 1961. The class 
structure in Manhattan had undergone a fundamental change. Reform clubs, 
which had periodically developed before the change, now began to organize 
among the new middle class inhabitants. It became apparent to them that 
the party could not be reformed by any outside effort. Together with 
several minor scandals, this loss of Tammany's voting strength (which 
was rooted in the lower class and immigrant families) allowed the reform 
clubs to mount a campaign sufficient enough to oust Tammany leaders. 
The fourth theory suggests that reform occurs when a repressed 
faction of the city makes i deo l ogi cal demands on a machine wh i ch forces 
it to collapse because of its inability to deal with such demands. Peter 
lOPendergast and Curley were the respective "bosses" in these 
cities. In 1939 the Democratic machine in Kansas City collapsed after 
Pendergast 1s conviction due to the hounding of the press and the Depart-
ment of Justice 1s diligence in pursuing tax evasion claims resulting 
from a bribe. For further discussion see: Alfred Steinberg~·The Bosses (New York: McMillan and Co., 1972) 
llJames Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962) See especially Chapter II for an account of the 
ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall. 
6 
Knauss12 and David Protess13 both express this concept in their analyses 
of the machine in the city of Chicago. It is their contention that once 
ideological demands are made, the machine will be forced to give way. 
Demands placed on the machine of an ideological nature (such as "civil 
rights") cannot be converted into patronage and therefore cannot be dealt 
with in the fashion that is usually employed by a machine. Ideology 
cannot be disaggregated. Even the less controversial areas such as air 
pollution must be dealt with in a way that the machine, ~machine, 
cannot profit from.14 
Each of these theories outlines either the process or conditions 
for the demise of the machine, noting that when and if certain conditions 
are met, the likelihood of the ma.chine's continued power is extremely 
limited. By preparing a chronicle of elements that lead to the fall of 
one machine or listing the elements that are antithetical to the very 
existence of any machine, these theories would hope to establish a basis 
for predicting the fall of the machine in Chicago. 
There is evidence that conditions that would tend to validate 
these theories do exist in Chicago. There is indeed a move to the 
suburbs as Banfield suggests, the formation of reform clubs as Wilson 
suggests and ideological demands are being made as Knauss and Protess 
12Peter Knauss, Chicago:· One Party State (Champaign, Illinois: 
Stipes Publishjng Co., 1970) 
13oavi d Protess, "Banfield' s Chi ca go Revisited," Socia 1 Service 
Review (June, 1974) 
14Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: Non-
Decision Making in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) 
7 
have stated. There are several other indices such as ticket-splitting, 
primary challenges, the emersion of ideologues, to some extent, the 
"Americanization of the immigrant 11 15 and the convictions of several top 
city officials that would indicate the presence of conditions for the 
demise of the machine. But the machine still remains in control of 
almost every local office. Republications and independents hold less 
than a half-dozen seats in the City Council. There must be a tool avail-
able to the machine to continue its hold over the elected positions in 
the city of Chicago; a strategy that has enabled the machine to overcome 
the forces suggested by these theories. This is where I believe the use 
of gerrymandering becomes an important part of the machine's efforts to 
retain its control. I will now proceed to a brief review of the liatera-
ture on the subject in order to lay the basis for this claim. 
The greatest amount of work on the general subject of reappor-
tionment has been confined to the levels of national and state 
legislative districts and school district boundaries. It has not been 
on the local level, where the influence of the machine can be noted. 
Rather, it has grown out of the case of Baker v Carr. 16 Gordon Baker 
and Robert Luce17 have dealt with the area concerning legislative redis-
tricting in light of the Supreme Court's decision of 11 one man, one vote 11 
15Eugene Lewis, The Urban Political System (New York: Holt, 
Rhinehart and Winston, 1973) 
16Baker v Carr 389 U.S. 186; S.Ct. 691 (1962) 
17Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: 
Random House, 1963); Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930) 
-8 
and the nature of legislative principles (respectively) in great detail. 
Along with Karl Bosworth and Andrew Hackerl8 their contributions have 
centered on the legal implications and.political consequences of these 
aspects of gerrymandering. Because they have focused on state and 
national levels, none of these authors have approached the subject in 
terms of the political adva~tages and/Or disadvantages and social conse-
quences that can be realized through the maneuvering of ·local legislative 
districts. Because the literature of the field does not examine gerry-
mandering (in any detail) in an urban machine setting, both citizens and 
students of politics are faced with the problem of the absence of adequate 
information. 
Charles Fishman, who has prepared a manual for black lawyers who 
wish to fight racial gerrymandering, writes: "This report was printed ... 
in the hope that the wide dissemination of this information would be of 
value to the black community as it seeks to assert its rights in the 
po 1 i ti cal arena. 11 19 
The emphasis in the book is on legal considerations used in com-
bating racial discrimination that is manifested through discriminatory 
reapportionment practices. Fishman's objective is to acquaint black 
leaders with the signs of gerrymandering, the effect it has on the black 
community, and to arm them with the legal elements necessary to combat 
18Karl A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments 11 in· The· 48 
States: Their Tasks as Polic Makers and Administrators (New York: 
o u ia mvers1 y, ; n rew acer, ongress1ona Districting: 
The Issue of Equal Representation (Washi_ngton: Brooki_ngs Institute, 
1963) 
19charles Fishman~ Rea ortionment and Racial Ger manderin 
(Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1971 
---
it. After Fishman initially states that he feels the power of the 
black community is in jeopardy because of gerrymandering, he refrains 
from considering any further political implications. It is from the 
perspective of these other implications that the balance of this study 
will view governmental development in Chicago. Political aspects such 
9 
as gerrymandering's effect on the nature of the City Council, the con-
tinued role of the machine, and the advancement of the political career 
of certain Chicago politicians as well as the consequences of these 
actions must be considered. When examined in concert, these considera-
tions present the overall effect that gerrymandering has had on the city. 
Any further discussion of these political implications and 
social consequences of gerrymandering should be preceded by an examina-
tion of the terms and e lerrents that are to be considered. Their 
description will become the groundwork upon which the relationship 
between gerrymandering and power in Chicago will be established. It is 
through this relationship that the effects of gerrymandering can best be 
viewed. 
11 
strategy will be referred to as "confinement, 11 and the second as 
11 dispersal. 11 (These two strategies of gerrymandering will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter V .) 
It is di ffi cult to determine, even approximately, what percent-
age of the overall control of the machine involves the actual use of 
gerrymandering. It is the express intention of this study to establish 
gerrymandering as an important tool (along with patronage and other forms 
of perquisites) in the machine's efforts to retain control in the city 
of Chicago. Because of the difficulty involved in identifying the actual 
extent of the role of gerrymandering, and in light of the fact that it 
is a tool employed by the machine to alter the social makeup of a parti-
cular community, the social consequences of the act of gerrymandering 
(not just its motivations) must be taken into account. 
The functional approach, 1 as a theoretical framework for examin-
ing and clarifying the relationship between actions and their social 
consequences,2 allows for the consideration of the role of gerrymandering 
in terms of its effect on the community in relation to the establishment 
(or prevention of) equitable representation. Furthermore, a functional 
analysis of the role of gerrymandering in the maintenance of machine 
control in Chicago provides an explanation of a social action that may 
not be empirically proven. That is to say, data can only respond to the 
questions asked of it and the data establishing gerrymanderi_ng in Chicago 
lRobert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (reved.; 
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp. 19-84 
2Jbi d. 
..... 
12 
will not respond, of itself, to the question 11\'1hy? 11 Because one could 
not be present to examine the motivations for gerrymandering, it becomes 
necessary to examine the consequences (both manifest and latent) of this 
social action and then impute possible reasons for them. 
In any analysis, the process or social action to be examined 
must be clearly defined and placed within the context in which it is to 
be analyzed. In this case, the process is referred to as gerrymandering 
and the following definition and etymology of the word will help to 
establish a basic working knowledge of the term: 
To gerrymander is to di vi de a state, county, city, etc. into 
sections, election districts or other civil divisions in an unnatural 
and unfair way with a view to give a political party an advantage 
over its opponent, or for some other improper purpose. 
In 1812 while Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts, the 
Republican legislature redistributed the districts in such a way that 
the shapes of the towns forming a single district in Essex County 
gave to the district a somewhat dragon-like contour. This was indi-
cated on a map of Massachusetts which Benjamin Russell, an ardent 
Federalist and editor of the 11 Centennal 11 , hung up over the desk in 
his office. The celebrated painter, Gilbert Stuart, coming in to 
the office one day and observing the uncouth figure, added with his 
pencil a head, wings and claws and exclaimed, 11 That will do for a 
salamander. 11 11 Better say a gerry-mander! 11 growled the editor; and 
the outlandish name, thus duly coined, soon came into general 
currency. (See illustration on following page.)3 
With the etymology of.the word developing out of a confrontation 
in Massachusetts, it is ironic that the first known cry for its abolition 
also originated there. At the Massachusetts State Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1853, Charles Francis Adams, a delegate from Boston contended: 
I maintain that the moment a majority in a Republic assumes to draw 
a distinction with the intent that certain men shall be enabled to 
3The etymology and definition of 11 gerrymandering 11 is derived 
from, Webster's New International Dictionary (1958) 
---
THE ORIGINAL GERRYMANDER: 
A LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT IN ESSEX COUNTY MASSACHUSETTS 
.... ·-' 
--- --
I 
I 
ANDOVER 
AMESBURY 
13 
14 
enjoy twice or thrice the amount of political power which an equal 4 number of other nen possess, that is the hour when tyranny begins ..• 
Something as intricate as this piece of "political skulduggery 115 
demands an equally intricate combination of professionals to achieve the 
intended results. By its very definition, the machine has the necessary 
strength as well as personnel to achieve this complicated end. But, are 
the forces of assimilation actually working against any attempt to gerry-
mander on racial and ethnic grounds, forces that would appear to be able 
to overcome ~strength or combination of personnel? 
In the review of the literature, the social scientists 1 view of 
assimilation was discussed. Perhaps additional insight into the ques-
tion of assimilation's role in counteracting the machine's influence can 
be gained from an examination adopting the ethnic group's point of view. 
Cynthia Enloe•s6 analysis of ethnicity deals with the concept of nation-
state and the role of ethnicity, but a great deal of what she says would 
seem just as applicable to the city of Chicago. She denies that as a 
nation-state develops (or in this case, if I may be permitted the 
analogy, the city of Chicago), ethnicity attenuates. Concerning the 
role of the ethnic group itself in the process of assimilation, Enloe 
says: 
••• "Thou shalt preserve thy integrity." This is not so with ethnic 
groups, which are constantly caught up in debates whether they should 
4Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1930) p. 25 
5Robert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's 
Gambi t 11 in Saturday Review (June 3, 1972) p. 42 · 
6cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973) p. 160 
pt 
15 
exist at all. Does the best hope for the community's members lie in 
assimilation, sloughing off peculiar traits and associations for the 
sake of joining the larger mainstream? If this is the consensus, it 
means creating organizations and tac ti cs to press for an end to 
discrimination and ascriptive criteria in public life ... For an 
ethnic community it requires a new self-consciousness about what 
exactly ethnic distinctiveness entails ..• the argument never ends; it 
conti9ues to shape the resources and priorities of communal develop-
ment. 
There exists a certain similarity between Dahl's estimation and 
that of Enloe. For Enloe, emphasis is placed on the community's decision 
whether or not to assimilate while Dahl appears to present assimilation 
in terms of the greater society's view of the process. While both views 
do illustrate the same process, Enloe adds the dimension of expressed 
choice by the community. Even though Dahl does not deny this aspect of 
assimilation, his preoccupation with the societal influence tends to 
question the importance of the community's role. 
If the type of consciousness that Enloe refers to can be raised, 
the effect would stimulate ideologically-oriented questions that machines 
are not able to handle. Ideology does not involve a trade-off; there is 
nothing to be sold and nothing to be bartered. A machine would be 
rendered less effective in a situation of this nature. Again, the 
response of the machine would be to stem such activity to prevent con-
frontation on a level where Jt could not meet its 11 opposition 11 without a 
clear advantage. In this case, efforts would necessarily be placed on 
preventing or at least minimizing the opportunity for the opposing groups 
to organize. 
7cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and.Political Development 
(Boston: Little, Bro\'m and Co., 1973) p. 160 
16 
In view of this application of assimilation to Chicago, it would 
seem as if the theory expressed by Knauss and Protess would prove to be 
most accurate. Within the conceptual framework of their theory, gerry-
mandering would become merely a tool for preventing the collective 
expression of an ideological demand. But in addition to this aspect of 
gerrymandering is the realization that the effects of its application 
would indicate an attempt to quantitatively destroy the vote power of 
these ethnic and racial minorities. 
The process by which the machine develops and applies the 
strategies of gerrymandering will be explained in the next chapter. 
The data presented will illustrate that the results of the redrawing of 
the ward boundaries served no other distinguishable purpose than the 
possible one explained by gerrymandering. To this end, the principles 
of gerrymandering seem to be applied in two ways in Chicago. First, 
there is the attempt to group racial or ethnic communities in certain 
areas with the consequence of containing their power by limiting the 
possible nurrber of representatives they can elect to the City Council. 
Secondly, and primarily in the case of the Spanish-speaking community, 
by dispersing the community into as many wards as possible, the machine 
is able to keep them from gaining a politically potent majority in any 
one ward and thereby keeping them from electing any representation at 
all. 
From a practical political standpoint, these aspects of gerry-
mandering in Chicago are identifiable. However, legally, their 
identification presents another problem. The data that is available 
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indicate that neither the national Congress nor the individual state 
legislatures has been able to define and outlaw gerrymandering.8 It has 
been largely the function of the courts to determine the legality in a 
few specific cases. But these legislatures have been able to define 
"equality of representation" and the courts have assured its political 
application in the "one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr. 
Reform cities seem more readily able to accept (or perhaps more 
precisely, have little choice but to accept) this ruling than is a 
machine city like_ Chicago. In Detroit, electing the councilmen at large 
precludes any attempt at gerrymandering, and in Los Angeles, the nature 
of the physical city and the scattered instance of racial and ethnic 
groupings makes such attempts futile. The high degree of decentraliza-
tion in New York and the rise of minor parties as well as the splintering 
of the Democratic Party have kept the possibility of gerrymandering 
nearly nonexistent (although gerrymandering does take place on a national 
and state legislative level}. 
The essence of the difference between the opportunity for gerry-
mandering in a machine city and in a reform city is that reform cities 
tend to be less centralized (formally and informally). They are too 
highly fragmented to effectively gerrymander·. Control of the apparatus 
for redrawing the ward boundaries is certainly a prerequisite for gerry-
mandering. In a h_ighly centralized city (even if~ informally), this 
control can be achieved with relative ease. It is also necessary to 
8Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: 
Random House, 1955) p. 26 
--
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obtain approval for this action (even if only tacit)> approval that can 
be realized through the logrolli.ng effects of the patron.age system. 
How has Chicago become centralized? To what degree has this 
increased the opportunity to gerrymander? The only way to answer these 
questions is to examine the political setting in Chicago. 
..... 
CHAPTER I I I 
THE POLITICAL SETTING OF CHICAGO 
The state of Illinois has two United States Senators and twenty-
four Congressmen. There are fifty-nine Illinois Legislative Districts, 
each with three representatives and one senator. Illinois is divided 
into 102 counties of varying size and population. 1 In the city of 
Chicago there are fifty wards2 with over 3 ,000 preci ncts3 and seventy-
fi ve community areas.4 There are appointed precinct captains and elected 
aldermen and committeemen. Within this complexity of geo-political and 
community divisions lies the structure of a polity. 
In a city like Chicago (which has seen a predominance of Demo-
cratic "machine style" politics for the last forty-five years, the last 
twenty under Mayor Richard J. Daley), the manifestation of representation 
is undeniably intertwined with both party and governmental roles. The 
very nature of the machine demands that party officials and representa-
tives work as closely as possible; indeed, sometimes they are indistin-
lillinois Blue Book, 1973-1974, (Springfield, Illinois: 
September, 1974) 
2chi cago Muni ci pal Code: Sec ti on 4: 12-64 
3source for the number of precincts is the Chicago Board of 
Election Commissioners. With the population shifts in the city during 
the time of this analysis, the number of precincts was constantly chang-
ing. Yet, at no time was it less than 3,000. 
4Local Community Fact Book (Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 
1960' 197 
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guishably close. 5 
The political atmosphere in Chicago does not seem to be one of 
corruption alone (even in light of the conviction of many top political 
leaders), for as Theodore Lowi has pointed out: 11A 'machine' (member) 
might be removed from office, its leaders indicted, but more than likely 
the organization suffered very little. Morale seems higher in defeat 
than in victory. u6 The situ a ti on may we 11 stern from the dominance 
of party politics, even though aldermanic elections are, by law, non-
partisan. 7 
In effect, there are two systems existing simultaneously in 
Chicago. One system is that of an established government: a mayor and 
city council. The other system is political, the Democratic Party. 
Before continuing with this analysis, a description of these two systems 
is in order. 
The formal party structure in Illinois is largely determined by 
the Illinois Election Code. 8 The code outlines nominating and election 
procedures that limit the scope of any political party. While this fac-
tor limits the growth of the party influence in certain directions, it 
5Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The 
New American Library, 1971) p. 21 
6Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold 
Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1937) p. v 
7chicago Municipal Code: Section 2:1-4 
8state of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:2; 8:2 (October 
22, 1973) 
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does not place parameters on internal party activities.9 
In Chicago, the Chairman of the Cook County Central Democratic 
Committee is also the Mayor of the city. This, of course, is not a 
provision of law but rather a result of political circumstance. Both 
positions have·e><'offitio powers encompassJng a wide scope of influence. 
The power vested in the Chairman of the party is transferred through a 
network of ward and township committeemen. It is then passed down 
through the precinct captains and finally reaches the party electorate. 
The degree of party-menber loyalty (which can be translated into the 
vote-getting ability) is rewarded with an appropriate number of perqui-
sites; the rewards may cover the entire spectrum from clearing debris or 
repairing a curb all the way to slating a loyal party member for office 
or granting a job. 
The fifty Democratic Ward Committeemen of the city of Chicago, 
together with the committeemen from thirty suburban townships, make up 
the Central Committee with Mayor Daley as their party chairman. The 
relationship that exists between the structure of the Party and the city 
government is best illustrated by this account that appears in Boss: 
Most of them (committeemen) hold an elective office. Many of the 
Daley Aldermen are ward bosses. Several are county commissioners. 
Others hold office as county clerk, assessor, or recorder of deeds 
and a few are congressmen and state legislators. Those who don't 
hold office are given top jobs running city departments ••• 10 
9state of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:8 (October 22, 
1973) 
lOMike Royko, Boss:· Richard·J~·oaley of Chicago (New York: The 
New American Library, 1971) p. 70 
F 
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At the time of this research, there were fifteen aldermen who were also 
ward committeemen {see table on next p_age). Just as the Mayor served as 
both party officer and elected official> so too, did these fifteen alder-
men. The positions of alderman and mayor in these cases would appear to 
take the duality of party and government and make them as one. This 
action prompted Royko to say of Daley, "He tries to separate political 
work from his duties as mayor, but nobody has every been able to see 
where one ends and the other begins. u 11 
The question has come up often: Does Mayor Richard J. Daley 
possess the slate-making power that many claim he does? In relation to 
this question of the power to decide who runs for what office, when and 
how, Mike Royko has this to offer: 
••. but even the slate-makers do not kid themselves into thinking 
they are deciding who the candidates will be. They listen to the 
applicants, push their favorites, the men from their wards, and wait 
for Chairman Daley to make up his mind. Some of the men on the 
slate-making committee have been surprised to find that they them-
selves were slated to run for offices they hadn't sought. It is a 
one man show and they know it. {Emphasis added.)12 
Although the governmental structure in Chicago originally was 
designed to be a "weak mayor-strong council" model, the informal reality 
of the Mayor's personality and organizational ability seem to have over-
come this formal designation. His personal contacts, energy, old friends 
(as well as his ability to make new ones) and his forceful manner aid in 
his projection of a strong mayoral position. Of course, his control over 
11Mike Royko, Boss: 
New American Library, 1971) 
12Ibid., p. 81 
Richard·J~ Daley of.Chitago (New York: 
p. 21 
The 
p 
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INTERSECTION OF ELECTIVE PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL 
POSITIONS IN CHICAGO 
(Aldermanic Elections - 1971) 
Government Party 
Name ···position Position Ward 
William Barnett Alderman Committeeman 2nd 
Eugene Sawyer Alderman Committeeman 6th 
Alexander Adduci Alderman Committeeman 9th 
Edward Vrdolyak Alderman Committeeman 10th 
Edward Burke Alderman Committeeman 14th 
Willi am Shannon Alderman Cammi t teeman 17th 
Thomas Fitzpatrick Alderman Committeeman 19th 
Bennett Stewart Alderman Committeeman 21st 
Vi to Marzullo Alderman Committeeman 25th 
Thomas Keane Alderman Committeeman 31st 
Wilson Frost Alderman Committeeman 34th 
Thomas Casey Alderman Committeeman 37th 
Anthony Laurino Alderman Cammi tteeman 39th 
Seymour Simon Alderman Cammi tteeman 40th 
Roman Pucinski Alderman Cammi tteeman 41st 
,.. 
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an estimated 35,000 patronage jobs is very helpful also.13 
The formal governmental structure of the city is controlled by 
Richard J. Daley in his capacity as mayor. Together with fifty alder-
men, they form the Chicago City Council (with Daley filling the role as 
presiding officer). Even within this formal designation, there is ample 
room for exercising a controlling force. In the case of the reappor-
tionment of ward boundaries, the function lies within the scope of 
legislative duties performed by the City Council. In spite of the fact 
that Daley's formal power is limited to the role of presiding officer, 
his control reaches the legislative procedures involved in the act of 
reapportionment. 
The apportionment function itself comes under the auspices of 
the Rules Committee of the City Council. The Chairman of the Committee 
is Alderman Thomas Casey (a regular Democrat who was first elected as 
Alderman of the 37th ward in 1965 at a special election held on May 18th; 
prior to his election, Casey served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman 
for the 37th ward). Alderman Casey appointed a special subcommittee to 
study available data and to make recommendations to the standing commit-
tee as to possible new ward boundaries. 
The Chairman of this special subcommittee was Alderman Thomas 
Keane (31st ward). The relationship between Keane and Daley is best ex-
plained by this passage by Mike Royko: "Keane is considered to be second 
in Party power .•• It is his (Daley) Council ••• and Keane manages it for 
13This estimate was reported in Gosnell 's ·Machine Politics as 
that of Alderman Leon Despres as cited by Robert C. Nelson, 11Machine 
Politics Described", in Chtistian SCiQrtce Monitor (July 10, 1961) 
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him. 11 This informal arrangement affords Daley the opportunity to wield 
tremendous power through the established formal structure. 
On November 5th, 1970, Thomas Keane, as Chairman of the special 
subcommittee, presented to the entire City Council his map for redis-
tricting the wards in Chicago. Keane 11 managed 11 forty-one votes in 
favor of the ordinance revision while the opposition numbered but six. 
The function of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the 
political atmosphere of Chicago to lay the groundwork for establishing 
the existence of gerrymandering and the role it plays in machine mainte-
nance. I have already indicated that the apportionment function is 
entrusted to the legislative branch of city government and that Mayor 
Daley is able to exert a great deal of influence upon those performing 
this function. Mention must be made of Daley's power and the extent to 
which he does indeed bring it to bear in legislative actions. 
It would appear as if the power that Daley exerts is a product 
of his unopposed position in Chicago. However, despite claims to the 
contrary by many of his party cronies, 14 Mayor Daley is not omnipotent. 
Edward Banfield asserts that the mayor faces three 11 checks 11 that prohibit 
him from exercising unlimited power.15 It is Banfield's contention that 
the three checks are placed by other elected officials, the court system 
and the electorate themselves. If Banfield's contentions are correct, 
14M i k e Roy k o ~ .:;.B o;;;s;,.:;;s;...;.:~R:,.:.;i~c:..;.:h.=:.a r.:_d::...  ...:...J...:.... -,..;D'-=a;-.;l...:...e"'"'=-'---.----,,-;"i-. 
New American Library, 1971 See especial y 
The 
discussion of this point.) 
15Edward c. Banfield; Political Influence (New York: The Free 
Press, 1961) pp. 238-239 
jilP 
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then Daley would have only limited power in the City Council. 
The first check that Banfield refers to would appear to be based 
on the premise that effective government necessitates counterbalancing 
measures between the different levels and branches: a premise that I 
would be hard pressed to find any fault with. This "balancing" that he 
finds "essential" can be achieved through different methods. There is 
that based on partisan or ideological grounds; that based on the concept 
of the "common good" regardless of the official's personal affiliation; 
and there is a balance borne of pressure and discipline. Banfield ad-
mits that this first check is usually performed by a member of the 
opposite party. But this end is not always so easily accomplished in 
Chicago in view of the fact that there seldom exists an elected official 
of the opposite political party. 16 
With the slate-making ability that Daley possesses and Banfield's 
own admission of Chicago's home rule provisions in the Illinois Consti-
tution17 and the absence of any real party opposition, there would seem 
to be few elected officials to perform this first check. When an 
official does attempt to check Daley's power he finds himself faced with 
16with the noted exception on the local level of Bernard Carey 
as Cook County States Attorney, there are few local officials elected 
in Chicago from the Republican Party. However, independent Democrats 
and other Democratic Party 11 i rregul ars 11 may also perform the function 
that Banfield refers to. 
17Illinois State Constitution, Article VII; Section 6 
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serious. primary and general election battles.18 
11 The principle of the separation of powers, which assures the 
court's independence .. _19 is the basis for the second check described by 
Banfield. A confrontation between the machine and the court would 
probably produce a civic controversy that may weaken the electorate's 
view of the machine. But Banfield continues by admitting that judges 
often take 11 cues 11 from political leaders in deciding cases (except in 
civil matters).20 He counters this admission by adding that one sure 
way to avoid political influence is to take the case to the Supreme 
Court. However, this action takes time, money and organization. Since 
forces opposing the machine have been hard pressed to organize viable 
campaigns in both city and county elections, the probability of organiz-
ing an effort that would reach the Supreme Court is highly limited (the 
present case of gerrymandering excepted). Furthermore, not only is 
Mayor Daley the personal friend of many of the judges, but the absence 
of merit selection has allowed the Mayor again to exercise his slate-
making power in slating perspective candidates for the bench in Chicago. 
18A classic example of Daley's ability to co-opt his opposition 
may well be the case of Benjamin Adamowski. In 1963, Adamowski was the 
Republican candidate for mayor running against Richard J. Daley. 
Adamowski was engaged in a bitter conflict with Daley and on several 
occasions claimed that Daley misused the police to spy on Adamowski. 
Daley narrowly won the election over Adamowski ts formidable challenge. 
For the election in· 1975, Benjamin S. Adamowski publically endorsed 
Richard J. Daley in his re-election campaign against Independent Demo-
cratic Alderman William Singer. 
19Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free 
Press, 1961) p. 239 
2orb; d., p. 239 
28 
In relation to the third check coming from the electorate, 
Banfield proposes that the electorate's potential to vote the machine 
out of office constitutes a force for compromise which, in turn, could 
compel the Mayor to respond to the interests of the electorate or face 
possible defeat in a primary or general election. With corruption in 
city government, loss of tax base, deteriorating schools and selective 
dispersal of services facing them,the electorate in Chicago still re-
frained from changing this potential into a reality in the primary and 
general election that provided Richard J. Daley with an unprecedented 
sixth term as mayor. 
These checks do exist; it is undeniable. Their effectiveness in 
view of the re-election of Mayor Daley and his aldermen remains question-
able. There seem to be but two alternative answers in light of these 
election results. Either the electorate is satisfied with city govern-
ment as it is (the Mayor has responded to their interests), or there exists 
another force that prohibits the exercise of this potential. It is 
entirely possible to establish the existence of such a force that would 
mitigate the opportunity to express the potential to vote out the 
machine without answering the question of the satisfaction or dissatis-
faction of the Chicago electorate. There are several conditions that 
may cause the electorate to refrain from exercising this potential even if 
they were dissatisfied. 
One condition that could cause reluctance to exercise the right 
of recall may well involve the Mayor's influence in the formal structure 
of the city's government. Control of the different agencies and levels 
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of the executive branch enables the Mayor to exert his influence on the 
lives of a great number of people connected with these different agencies. 
This passage from Banfield (when coupled with the knowledge of the 
Mayor's ever present slate-making power) aptly describes the depth of 
his influence: 
The executive, however, is not a single body. It is several. The 
mayor is one. The city treasurer and city clerk, both elected and 
therefore no more responsible to the mayor than he to them, are 
others. Schools are run by a board appointed by the mayor but not 
removable by him. Public housing is run by another such board, the 
transit authority by another, parks by still another •.. 21 
The combination of party chairman and mayor tends to overcome the formal 
decentralization that this explanation of the executive branch of Chica~ 
go's government indicates. The influence that can be exerted on the 
lives of all individuals associated with these facets of the government 
(not to mention those individuals who can be reached by other party mem-
bers) may account for some of the conditions that prevent a specific 
portion of the city from exercising the potential Banfield referred to. 
There are other points at which the formal separation of party 
position and nonpartisan official seem to disappear. This in itself 
also may keep certain members of the electorate from initiating any 
potential check on the Mayor. Besides the half-dozen self-proclaimed 
independents, there is only one person on the current city council who 
claims to be anything but a Democrat, Alderman Dennis Block (48th ward}. 
Opposition to the Regular Democratic Party leadership in the 
21Edward C. Banfield~ Political Influence (New York: The Free 
Press, 1961} p. 236 
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Chicago City Council rarely, if ever, exceeded ten votes. 22 The esti-
mated average of opposition is closer to two votes. This study of the 
opposition illustrates more closely the connection between the structure 
of the Democratic Party and the nature of government in Chicago. 
The reasons for explaining the relationship between the Demo-
cratic Party and Chicagols city government is to illustrate that the 
unification of these two separate entities has created an atmosphere 
one can safely assume that the interests of one of these two entities is 
undoubtedly the interest of the other. 
Based on this awareness of the mutual interests of the Party and 
the elected officials in Chicago, there are grounds to impute possible 
reasons for certain political actions. If the role of the City Council 
as redistricter was indeed biased by the influence of the Democratic 
Party, then the need for continued gerrymandering as a result of this 
bias should be examined. However, before entertaining any notions of 
bias and collusion, the concept of gerrymandering should be placed in a 
national as well as local perspective to gain some insight into its 
possible political repercussions. 
22An unpublished study by Ole Bjarrum of Loyola University in 
Chicago of 250 randomly selected ordinances in 1967 and 1973 indicated 
that 205 of the 250 received no opposition at all. In those instances 
where opposition was recorded, the average number of votes in opposi-
tion to machine policy was 3.75. There were only three occasions where 
the vote in opposition exceeded 10. 
23Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold 
Gosnell~ Machine Politics:· Chicago·Model (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1937} p. x 
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
••. ingenious techniques for capitalizing upon ethnic and racial 
heterogeneity have been invented in city after city ..• The machines (which employed them) were based upon a congeries of people with 
uncommon ends, held together at the center by logrolling and at 
the periphery by fraternite, egalite and ignorance .•• 
One of the "ingenious techniques" that machines have employed is gerry-
mandering. It has invaded all levels of government in the United 
States and owes its allegiance to neither Democrat nor Republican, to 
no particular region of the country, level of economy or extent of 
education. 
While it is the expressed intention of this study to examine 
gerrymandering in Chicago, a proper perspective from which to judge the 
consequences of this action must be porvided. To develop the basis for 
this perspective, I have chosen to examine historical aspects of the use 
of gerrymandering on national and state levels and then proceed to its 
specific application in Chicago, highlighting both similarities and 
differences among the levels. 
Prior to the 11 one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr, there 
were seven states (New Jersey, Idaho, South Carolina, Montana, Arizona, 
New Mexico and Nevada) that, regardless of population size, allowed each 
!Theodore Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition, 11 Harold Gosnell, 
Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1937) p. v 
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county the same nunt>er of representatives in the state senate. 2 (This 
does not include those states that followed the same formula for their 
lower house or for both houses.) As Karl Bosworth has pointed out, 
under a system that permits inequality of representation 11 ••• any 
lsovereigntyt of counties or towns is based on entrenched political 
power, not on constitutional or democratic theory. 11 3 If Bosworth's 
estimation is correct, then a system existing with these inequities 
illustrates a model where the states involved are unitary and not 
federal in their makeup. With inherent inequities in the system that 
result from variations in size and population such as these do, the use 
of gerrymandering to the advantage of any particular political party 
becomes an elementary maneuver. 
The extent to which 11 ••• a ci vi 1 di vision can be drawn to present 
an unfair advantage to a given political party" may best be noted by the 
example of the New Jersey legislature. In 1960, 11 ••• rural Sussex 
Countyts 49,255 inhabitants and metropolitan Essex County's 923,545 each 
sent one senator to the New Jersey Legislature. 11 4 Similar inequities 
were noted in 1963 and in 1965 in Washington, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Minnesota, Virginia and Indiana (as well as in the seven previously men-
tioned states). But each of these examples and the countless others 
2Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution {New York: 
Random House, 1955) p. 25 
3Kar1 A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments," The· Forty-
Ei ht States, Their.Tasks ·as ·Polic ·Makers and Administrators {New York: 
ia n1vers1ty ress, 1 p. 
4Baker, op. cit., p. 25 
noted by Baker, Bosworth, Hacker et· aL i 11 ustrate a representation 
borne of unequal size and not of the type that occurred in Chicago. 
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The undemocratic principles at work in reapportionment that fail 
to reflect the true population of a given civil division are more readily 
corrected than those realized through gerrymandering for partisan, ethnic 
or racial reasons. It is true that gerrymandering of the New Jersey 
type denies equality of representations but it does not single out a 
specific portion of the population (identifiable by race, political 
affiliation, or ethnic background). In fact, this former type of reap-
portionment develops usually for one of two reasons: constitutionally 
inadequate provisions that limit the ability to correct these inequities 
or legislative failure to redistrict in accordance with population shifts, 
even when such constitutional provisions were available. 
These two prevailing reasons for the inequality of districts are 
based on the realization that like Sussex and Essex Counties in New 
Jersey, the difference was a product of population size. An equally as 
corrnnon practice is the effects of reapportionment that collect or ex-
clude certain sections of a given area in terms of past voting records. 
A cursory examination of some of the 11 cartographi cal surgery 115 that took 
pl ace in New York wi 11 demonstrate this type of gerrymanderi_ng. 
In both 1951 and 1961 the Republican legislature. in New York 
found it quite elementary to gerrymander Congress ion al Districts {without 
seriously affecting population totals for the districts). What was the 
SGordon E. Baker~·rhe·Rea ortionment·Revoluti 
Random Houses 1955) p. 82 
old 12th District (nm·1 the 15th) wound its way through the streets of 
Brooklyn gathering small pockets of Republicans. For four straight 
elections, the Republicans succeeded in electing one of their own to 
34 
Congress from this district. In 1960, the election was lost to a Demo-
crat. In 1961, the Republican legislature created the 15th District 
(in Brooklyn), returning it to their list of 11 safe 11 GOP districts. 6 The 
resulting map, a product of the Republican legislature's attempt to 
return lost Republican seats, resembled the map that Governor Gerry first 
produced in 1812. 
In an article in the New Republic, Robert Dietsch has quoted 
Congressman Emanuel Celler (Dem., New York) as saying that the New York 
Congressional Districts resemble 11 .•. wash hanging on a line, quaint 
abstract painting and East and West·Pakistan. 11 In the same article 
Dietsch relates Tylor and Wells' estimation by citing 11 •.. the Districts 
appear as the Jaws of the Wrench, The Upside Down Crocodile, The Camel 
Biting the Tail of the Buffalo ~Jhich is Stepping on the Tail of the 
Dachshund. 117 
These descriptions are only slightly exaggerated for effect. 
Splitting blocks, retracing steps, and apparently abandoning all logic 
are characteristics of this type of apportionment. But the loss of logic 
is only visible to those who do not bother to examine the case further. 
6Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: 
Random House, 1955) p. 83 
7Robert W. Dietsch, "The 1971 Gerrymander11 in The New Republic 
(May 29, 1971) p. 21 
,. 
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The 1961 map of New York 1 s legislative districts illustrates the depth 
of influence of gerrymandering by what appears to be a totally illogical 
creation of a district. The 16th legislative district, comprised in part 
by the northern section of Staten Island, is continued six to e_ight miles 
away in the center of Brooklyn.a This maneuver is "f>C>lititally l_ogical 
because voting patterns indicate that both areas are highly Republican. 
In the case of New York and California in 1961, and the other 
states previously mentioned, this type of gerrymandering is best 
achieved under certain limited conditions. The operationalizing of 
gerrymandering is facilitated when one party clearly dominates both 
houses of the legislature (and therefore controls the machinery for re-
districting) and when that party holds the position of chief executive 
in the state. When a party dominates the legislature, it becomes much 
easier to rearrange districts to facilitate the re-election of party 
members (especially when there is no fear of reprisal from the opposi-
tion or little chance of a veto from the governor). From the two 
definitions we have arrived at (machine and gerrymandering), one is 
faced with the consideration that those conditions that facilitate gerry-
mander are approximately the same conditions that describe the existence 
of a machine. This is not to say that .Q.!!..!y_ a legislature with one party 
with a clear majority or a machine controlled polity is able to gerry-
mander, but rather that these particular conditions facilitate it. In 
the previous chapter, I re 1 ated how dominance of the Chi c_ago City Coun-
8-rhis evaluation is based on the New York Congressional District 
Map as it appeared in the.Congressional Quarterly (4-10-71) 
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cil by Mayor Daley and the Democratic Party facilitated the opportunity 
for ge rryman de ring. 
In the following chapters, I will explain how that opportunity 
became a reality. What of the actual mechanics of implementing such a 
technique as gerrymandering? Chicago, the archetype of the "old 
politics,. 11 usually manages to come up with the latest methods and the 
most advanced technology for aiding its political leaders in their bids 
for re-election. Chicago will have to take a back seat on this occa-
sion, however. While a few members of the Chicago City Council redrew 
ward boundaries, Robert Dietsch, in an article in the Saturday Review, 
was revealing how the Hoosiers tech11ol ogi cally surpassed the efforts of 
Mayor Daley and Company. The article states: 
The baroque possibilities of gerrymander-by-computer are illus-
trated in Indiana, where the fifth Congressional District has been 
cybemetically carved out to be ultra-safe for Republican Represen-
tative Elwood H. Hillis. The district was made to run from just 
south of the Michigan line through at least half of the Hoosier 
state to Indianapolis. The gerrymanders did throw into Hillis' 
district a portion of Washington Township (outside of Indianapolis) 
that is turning Black and that normally votes Democratic. In a com-
plex bit of mathematics that was aided by the computer, the gerry-
manderers figured that Hillis could lose those 4,000 Black votes and 
still remain safe, and that the votes meanwhile would be taken away 
from Democrat Andrew Jacobs, Jr., in an adjoining district. For 
Jacobs' own district the GOP computer worked out some very fancy 
geometry. The district used to be 11 L11 shaped and had only eight 
comers--a relatively compact and contiguous district. But today, 
after the work ~f the Indiana gerrymanderers and the computers, 
Jacob's district has at least twenty-four corners, and its western 
boundary jigs and jags like a salamander scurrying over hot rocks.9 
The political cartoon on the following page perhaps best illus-
trates the relationship that has developed between the political 11 boss 11 
9Robert W. Dietsch, 11The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's 
Gambit, 11 Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972): 42-47 
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and the technological age.10 It may well suggest that the 11 boss 11 has 
not died off, but rather has become computerized; a nameless figure, a 
product of our need for progress. 
Recounting the story of the Indiana 5th Congressional District 
demonstrates the degree to which gerrymandering has become a part of 
our political culture. It would not seem out of the scope of this 
analysis to envision an entire profession growing up around the desire 
for more precise gerrymandering. One must not only examine population 
statistics, but growth charts, numbers of registered voters and partisan 
strength are all now fundamental to a successful gerrymander like that 
of the Indiana 5th Congressional District. With the computers enormous 
capacity to store, categorize and recall information, the results can 
now be more exact and equally as devastating. A~ any programmer can 
tell you, a computer is only as neutral as those who program it. While 
they were originally used to aid in the complex calculations necessary 
to comply with the Court's ruling concerning the population of legisla-
· tive district, computers now are used to consider those factors they 
were i ni ti ally designed to ignore. 
While Indiana may have affected the first noted use of technol-
ogy, Chicago has used gerrymandering (in its more traditional form} for 
quite some time. In fact, Gosnell recounts this episode in Chicago's 
history: 
In drawing ward lines all the tricks of gerrymandering are also em-
ployed by the aldermen ••• the extent to which nationality and racial 
lORobert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's 
Gambit,'' Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972) p. 43 
--
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groups were cut into small bits by the 1921 and 1931 ward lines ... 
Ward committeemen of Irish extraction have been particularly active 
in splitting up their bailiwicks so as to prevent their defeat by 
Italian> Polish or Jewish rivals.11 
It would appear that in the 160 years since Elbridge Gerry, all that has 
been learned is how to apply more complex techniques to an already com-
plex method. 
Just as time has not changed the effects of gerrymandering on 
the political scene, it would appear that time is unable to change even 
the scene itself in Chicago. Harold Gosnell has said 11 ••• the political 
power structure of the city of Chicago has probably changed the least 
during the decades following 1937 ..... 12 From an historical perspective, 
one can witness the eventual demise of all other big city machines;13 
yet, Chicago still is run by a Democratic machine organization. 
In this era that Gosnell refers to, there has always been a 
close relationship between the mayor of Chicago and the Cook County Cen-
tral Democratic Committee. Through patronage and the control of party 
nominations, along with the informal relationship created between county 
agencies, the political 11 bosses 11 of this era have developed a well-
functioning machine.14 
llHarold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics:· Chicago Model (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1937) pp. 30-31 
12rbi d., p. 221 
13For more in depth anal~sis and explanation see Alfred Stein-
berg~ ·The Bosses (New York: Md1lllan, 1972} 
14Gosnell, op. cit., p. 223 
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Democratic party chairman in the early period, Patrick A. Nash, 
11wa lked hand-in-gl ave with Mayor Kelley • 11 15 There was no question as to 
the significance of the Kelley-Nash machine. 
In the middle period, the election of Martin Kennelley as a 
reformer was engineered by Party Chairman Colonel Jacob Arvey to justify 
party maintenance. He felt it was necessary to "suffer through 11 the 
interim with a reformer rather than face possible defeat. While 
Kennelley was not part of the machine-producing group, the political 
boss of the period (Arvey) staged Kennelley's election, a task that only 
a powerful man could have accomplished. 
When Richard J. Daley decided to run for mayor after his elec-
tion as Party Chairman in 1953, he was denied Arvey's support but still 
went on to win the primary over incumbent Mayor Kennelley in 1955. 16 It 
was a major step forward in machine politics in Chicago to try and com-
bine the two positions of mayor and party chairman in one individual. 
It would take a great deal of political expertise to accomplish such a 
bold maneuver. 
In the mayoral election of that year, Daley defeated Robert E. 
Merriam with his 11 greatest support coming from the Black Belt and from 
the west side wards where the machine was strongest. 11 17 The role of the 
black wards in this first Daley victory is important to the consideration 
l5Harold F. Gosnell~ Machine Politics:· ·chicago Model (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 223 
16Ibid., pp. 226-227 
17rbid., p. 221 
at hand. It was the black area that put Daley in power, and it would 
be demonstrated later that continued support by the black community 
would be essential to his re-election. 
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Daley won over Sheehan in 1959 with big support again coming 
from the black areas (although with 71.4% of the vote marked for Daley, 
it was not to prove to be a test of his strength in the black areas). 
But in 1963, Daley faced his most formidable challenger since Merrian 
(and in terms of election results, his most formidable challenger to 
date). Daley won the election over Benjamin Adamowski with a vote mar-
gin of 55.7% to 44.3% •. An analysis of the election results establishes 
that Adamowski received 51% of the votes cast in all white areas while 
Daley won an 11 enormous black vote. 11 18 There could be no doubt about the 
election outcome: without the black areas Daley would have had much 
greater difficulty in winning that election. 
In the fo 11 owing chapters, i ndi vi dual wards with large numbers 
of minorities will be examined to illustrate the link between the need 
for the support of the black areas and the use of gerrymandering in 
achieving some control over these areas. The analysis is divided into 
two chapters to correspond to the two major methods of achieving control; 
i.e., "dispersal 11 and "confinement. 11 In terms of the confinement strate-
gy, the 7th, 14th and 19th wards will be examined; the dispersal strategy 
will be examined through an analysis of gerrymandering in the 31st ward . 
. 18r~ike Royko, Boss:· ·Richard J~ Daley·of Chicago (New York: The 
New Arrerican Library, 1971) 
CHAPTER V 
GERRYMANDERING IN CHICAGO: 
AN OVERVIEW 
The complaint has been made that the entire city of Chicago has 
been gerrymandered in the reapportionment of its wards in 1971. 1 The 
contention involves the concept of 11 key 11 wards which allegedly were 
altered to allow regular· Democrats to obtain or to strengthen their hold 
in certain areas of the city. The result of such a situation would be 
that the 'surrounding wards would suffer from this remappi ng2 and there-
fore would be 11 inadvertantly gerrymandered; 11 if a sufficient number of 
11 key 11 wards existed, the city as a whole (all fifty wards) would also 
certainly be affected by the reapportionment. 
lThe entire city gerrymander \.'tas outlined in the brief filed by 
William Cousins in the case of Cousins v City Council, 73-1891; 73-2127, 
7th Cir. (1971). In this brief filed with the District Court in Chicago, 
Cousins, as attorney for the plaintiffs, contended that more than just 
the blatantly gerrymandered wards were at stake. 
2The logical conclusions, as the theory was presented by Cousins~ 
is that when a particular ward is gerrymandered to afford one party or 
individual a certain electoral advantage, those civil divisions immedi-
ately contiguous to the ward in question would undoubtedly suffer a 
comparable miscarriage of justice. To draw the argument to its fullest, 
presumably, if one ward was gerrymandered it could affect every other 
ward in the city in what may be called a "ripple effect. 11 It is my 
understanding that Cousins did not intend for this to be the conclusion 
we were to draw from his theory, but rather that there were indeed a 
series of smaller "ripple effects" simultaneously affecting the city. 
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What I propose to do in this chapter is establish an overview 
of four wards in the city that I consider 11 key 11 wards. 3 By examining 
the 7th, 14th, 19th and 31st wards I would hope to present a. general 
picture of the nature of gerrymandering in the city. In the following 
chapter, the 31st ward will be examined in greater detail with the ex-
press intention of explicating the problem and its ramifications in 
terms of social consequence. 
Inasmuch as there is obvious di ffi cul ty (and questionable value) 
in examining all fifty wards, these particular wards were chosen to 
highlight the type of situation encountered as well as to present con-
crete examples of the relationship between the Democratic Party and the 
act of gerrymandering in Chicago. 
The rationale for lllY choice of wards involves both political and 
legal aspects as well as the socio-economic elements of the communities 
involved. In terms of the legal consideration, in the case brought to 
trial4 three of the four wards were named among those alleged to be most 
flagrantly gerrymandered (all but the 19th). All four wards were experi-
encing a racial change in the nature of their electorates. All four 
wards were 11machine dominated" wards controlled by machine aldermen in 
tandem with the Democratic Ward Committeeman (who, in three of the four 
cases, was the same man,. the 7th ward bei_ng the exception). 
3MY choice of the term key wards is designed to coincide with 
the theory as introduced by Cousins but in a more limited sense as the 
remainder of the text will bear out. 
·4coosins v·city-Countil of.Chitago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th cir. 
( 1971) 
jP 
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While they shared these elements in common, there are elements 
in each ward that make the individual ward particularly important to a 
study of this nature. In 1971, the Alderman of the 7th ward was Nichol as 
J. Bohling. Within two months of his election he was appointed to fill a 
vacancy on the Bench in Chicago which in turn forced a vacancy in his 
aldermanic seat. The special election that followed entertained a field 
of sixteen candidates; an election that resulted in a run-off between Rev. 
Richard Lawrence (the Independent Voters of Illinois endorsed candidate 
and former member of the Woodlawn Organization) and Robert Wilinski (a 
community activist with local youth groups and restaurant and bar mana-
ger). After Wilinski won the electionlll Rev. Lawrence joined several 
others in filing suit to claim gerrymandering in Chicago in the hopes of 
gaining relief in terms of the 7th ward. In 1973, the Federal Court of 
Appeals ordered the 7th ward redrawn and another election held. At this 
time, Wilinski declined to seek the office and Gerald Jones (former city 
college administrator, and presently a sociology teacher) won the elec-
tion. Subsequent to this action, a federal three-judge Appeals Panel 
ordered the 7th ward returned to its origin al boundaries and denied 
Wilinski the aldermanic seat, leaving Jones as the alderman.5 In the 
1975 aldermanic elections, Robert Wilinski, the Regular Democratic 
5The court's decision to return the 7th ward to its original 
boundaries came after the major portion of the research for this paper 
had been finished. Nonetheless, the outcome of the decision has little 
or no bearing on the study insofar as the order to redraw the ward 
boundaries does not prove that gerrymandering didn't take place just as 
the initial order to redraw did not prove that gerrymandering did take 
place. 
candidate, defeated Gerald Jones in yet another run-off election and 
now serves as the alderman of the 7th ward. 
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Before, during and after this political battle, the 7th ward 
was experiencing a racial changeover. Just prior to and after the 
election the area became largely black and Latino. The ward is ideal 
for this type of study .. -racially changing, politically turbulent with 
Democrat battling Independent--and as such lends itself to gerrymander-
ing. 
The 14th ward is a blue collar, middle class neighborhood 
experiencing a somewhat similar and yet unique change. The alderman 
before the alleged gerrymandering as well as after it was Edward M. 
Burke. The 14th ward has been a "machine dominated" ward at least since 
1953 when Joseph P. Burke, the father of the current alderman, won in a 
special election. When Joseph Burke died in December of 1968, his son 
was slated by the machine to run in the special election of March 14, 
1969. Edward Burke won re-election in both 1971 and 1975. With the 
influx of blacks into the 14th ward in the late sixties and carrying over 
into the seventies, the ward was undergoing a change that might have 
created a contest for Burke possibly resulting in the election of a 
black a 1 derman. 
While the 14th ward was a blue collar neighborhood, the 19th ward 
was a predominantly Irish Catholic, upper-middle class area whose bound-
aries appeared to move westward with each reapportionment. It, like the 
two previous wards, was "machine dominated" at the time of the 1971 reap-
portionment. For four consecutive terms, Alderman Thomas Fitzpatrick 
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(who also served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman) represented the 
19th ward in the City Council. Fitzpatrick became an influential Demo-
crat through his role on the Zoning Board and Plan Commission (Fitzpatrick 
was Chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Zoning). Again, this ward, 
like the two previous wards, was experiencing a racial change that may 
have caused competition for the aldermanic seat. 
The 31st ward is also "machine dominated:" it had been 11 run 11 for 
thirty years by the same man--Thomas Keane, until his conviction for mail 
fraud and conspiracy in 1973. It too was undergoing a change in the 
electorate. But the change in the 31st ward is unlike the other wards 
in that the change is not from white to black, but from white to 
Spanish-speaking. There are other elements that make the 31st ward an 
important choice: the alderman from the 31st ward was in charge of the 
reapportionment itself. A study of this ward highlights the two major 
approaches employed by the machine to gerrymander (i.e., "dispersal" and 
"confinement"). 
All four wards were "machine dominated 11 prior to the alleged 
gerrymandering. They then underwent a demographic change in the elector-
ate that could have precipitated a challenge to the machine for the 
aldermanic seats. Finally, after the reapportionment of the ward bound-
aries, these wards were returned to their original social makeup and 
"machine dominance" continued. 
A statistical analysis of each of these wards will demonstrate 
how this change was accomplished. While it is perhaps easy to place 
greater emphasis on either the pros or cons of a given argument with the 
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use of statistics, in a more comprehensive sense they tend to speak for 
themselves. The chart on the following page lists the population shifts 
for the four wards being analyzed. The change is based on census 
figures for the last twenty years and in the case of all wards except 
the 31st includes a three per cent conversion factor. This factor was 
added to the population figures in the 1970 census on1y·after the new 
ward boundaries were considered. It is a methodological inclusion that 
results from various claims of census inaccuracies that have been 
reported since 1970.6 The three per cent figure is somewhat arbitrary 
in that it is designed to meet a compromise between the two major claims 
concerning the inaccuracies. The United States Census Bureau has ad-
mitted to a possible two per cent undercount because of inaccurate 
reporting methods, while urbanologist Pierre de Vise claims that 
Chicago's population has been undercounted by over 138,000 people (about 
four per cent) J Both claims of inaccuracy are based on the 1970 census 
figures. The 31st ward, hat1ever, does not include this factor because 
of an updated population count of the Spanish-speaking (based on ward 
boundaries} that was released by the City of Chicago Department of 
Development and Planning.8 
6The account of de Vise's claims of census inaccuracy were re-
ported by Dennis Byrne in the Chicago Daily News, Tuesday, March 26, 
1974. 
7rbid. 
8The report released by the Department of Development and Plan-
ning for the City of Chicago can be obtained from their Office of 
Jnformati on. 
48 
POPULATION CHANGES AS NOTED BY CENSUS DATA 
1960 1970 Total After 
Ward Community Area Population Population Reapportionment: 
Count* Count** 1971*** 
7th South Shore 7 ,018 55,483 
7th South Chicago 2,488 10 ,208 
9,506 65,791 29,563 
------- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - ------
14th Fuller Park 11,692 7' 168 
14th New City 166 2' 126 
14th West Englewood 1,368 4,000 
14th Englewood 13,600 17,000 
26 ,826 30 ,294 6 ,760 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
19th Auburn-Gresham 15 7,878 
19th Beverly 14 0 
19th Washington Hts. 1,848 10 ,641 
19th Mt. Greenwood 4 88 
19th Morgan Park 4,498 7 ,401 
6 ,799 26,008 7,714 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31st Humboldt Park 7 ,860 11, 122 
31st West Town 20 ,935 48,900 
28, 795 60,022 22,159 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
* 
** 
*** 
The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1960 
for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the 
Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward. 
The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1970 
for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the 
Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward. 
The totals in this column represent the black or Spanish-speaking 
totals for the individual wards after the 1971 reapportionment in 
Chicago. 
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As of 1960, on the South Side of Chicago along the lakefront, 
the 7th ward was primarily comprised of two community areas: South 
Shore and South Chicago. According to the United States Census figures, 
South Shore contained 7,018 blacks. 9 Immediately south of this area is 
the community designated as South Chicago; in 1960, there were 2,488 
blacks. This brought the total black population of the ward to over 
9,000. In the same two communities in 1960, the white population 
totaled 113,493; a ratio of greater than ten to one. 
If the ward boundaries of the 7th ward and all of the immediate-
ly surrounding wards had not been changed after the 1970 census, the 
black population of this area would have totaled 65,791. The white 
population of the same area under the same conditions would have totaled 
60,493. The ratio of black to white had changed from ten to one in 
favor of the white population to a five thousand-plus black majority. 
However, with the eventual change in the ward boundaries, the 
newly constructed 7th ward, including the conversion factor of three per 
cent, contains a black population of 29,563. Over 30,000 blacks were 
11 excluded 11 from the 11 new 11 ward. Where did they go? Certainly, it is 
evident that moving the ward did not involve the actual displacement of 
families, but the possible political reasons for this action would tend 
to leave the question open for further discussion. The largest portion 
of the 30,000 blacks (approximately 60%) were included in the redrawi_ng 
9All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the 
populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagwa and P. 
M. Hauser~·tocal Corilmunity·Fatt Book (Chicago: Chicago Community 
Inventory, 1950, 1960), unless otherwise noted. 
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of the 5th ward. The 5th ward is 11 traditionally 11 independent (twenty 
years of service by anti-machine Alderman Leon Despres). If one consid-
ers the election outcome in the pre-gerrymandered 5th ward a foregone 
con cl usi on in terms of the uncha llengabil i ty of Alderman Despres, then 
the possible reason for the increased black population in the ward could 
be an attempt by the machine to obfuscate any future hopes Despres (a 
white) might have. 
The results of the ward boundary change are evident. The white 
population of the 7th ward after the change was 37,569. There were now 
8,000 more whites in the ward, as opposed to the 5,000 black majority 
before the ward boundaries were changed. The opportunity for the machine 
to control the election was increased with the presence of a clear 
majority of whites; for slate-making reasons, it is certainly easier to 
appeal to one ethnic or racial group than it is to appeal to two distinct 
groups in the same ward. The outcome of the elections that resulted 
from the change bears out this analysis; when the court ordered the ward 
remapped (and as it turns out, in favor of a majority of blacks) a black, 
Gerald Jones,won the election. When the federal Appeals Panel of judges 
returned the ward to its origin a 1 11 gerrymandered 11 boundaries (with the 
8,000 white majority) a white, Robert Wilinski, won the election. 
Why not create a new black ward and 11 allow11 the residents to 
elect a machine candidate? At present the machine is deali~g quite well 
with the fifteen black wards already in existence. One can only theorize 
as to why they hope to limit the number of black wards. However, taking 
into account the possibility that these fifteen aldermen have a racial 
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heri t_age in common and that this heritage may be strong enough to cause 
them to vote along racial or ideol_ogical lines, the machine might fear 
the outcome of this unification in relation to possible opposition to 
machine policy. It is true that fifteen is not sufficient to cause 
great turmoil; yet, with the inclusion of the half-dozen independents 
and one Repub 1 i can in the City Council, sheer numbers are enough to 
cause party regulars some concern about adding additional all-black 
wards. 
By using gerrymandering to control the number of wards where 
blacks could possibly elect their own representatives, the machine is 
able to limit the extent to which this potential unification can approach 
a reality. Through this process of containment (which is necessary be• 
cause of the large population of blacks in the city as opposed to the 
Spanish-speaking), the machine is able to establish a limited number of 
all black wards and divide the remaining blacks up in such a manner as 
to keep them from gaining a political advantage in any other wards. 
The 7th ward is not the only example of the use of this contain-
rrent policy. Located approximately in the geographic center of the city 
is the geopolitical distinction referred to by municipal code as the 14th 
ward. This ward is comprised (either wholly or in part) of the community 
areas known as Fuller Park, New City, West Englewood and Englewood.lo 
10While the population figures for each community area are close 
to being accurate, the transformation from community figures to ward 
figure·s tend to distort the actual picture to some degree. However, the 
overall effect is minimized by us_ing the same formula in all cases and 
adding the conversion factor. · 
52 
The combined black population for these four community areas (in pro-
portion to the percentage they contribute to the total makeup of the 
ward) was 26,826 in 1960. The white population for the same period was 
30,383; a white majority of som:? 4,000 persons existed at the time of 
the 1960 census. Had the ward boundaries remained the same after the 
1970 census, the black population of the 14th ward would have totaled 
30 ,294. The increase of less than 4,000 blacks in less than ten years 
is not as large an increase as many of the other wards in the city ex-
perienced in the same time span. But this increase, coupled with the 
decrease in the white population from 30,833 to 18,991, would have 
given blacks a clear majority in the ward. Obviously, the loss of in-
habitants in the ward necessitated a change in the ward boundaries. 
The 14th ward contained nearly 27,000 blacks in 1960 and over 
30,000 in 1970; one would expect that if the pattern of gerrymandering 
used in the 7th ward was applied to the 14th ward, the results would 
indicate a probable loss of one-half of its black population. After re-
drawing the ward boundaries, however, the black population (including 
the conversion factor of three per cent) was 6,760. Nearly 25,000 blacks 
were drawn out of the "new" ward. The 7th ward lost approximately 55% 
of its black population while the 14th lost almost 76%. 
As indicated by the increase in the black population of both the 
3rd and 11th wards, the blacks excluded from the 14th were drawn into 
these wards. The 3rd ward was redrawn to include approximately 16,000 of 
those excluded (with the 11th receiving the remaining amount). The 
eastern edge of the 14th ward (a totally black area) was remapped into 
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the 3rd ward (which in turn allowed the reapportioners to move the 14th 
ward farther west into 11 all white" areas). The 3rd ward was 11 controlled11 
for the machine by United States Congressman Ralph Metcalfe. (Metcalfe, 
former alderman and current Democratic Ward Committeeman for the 3rd 
ward had previously demonstrated his loyalty to the machine but began a 
major break as a result of his position on community control of the 
police and his endorsement of William S. Singer for the Democratic candi-
date for Mayor. The complete break did not materialize until after the 
1971 redrawing, however.) With the 3rd ward being both a black and a 
machine ward, the influx of additional blacks would not affect the future 
election outcomes. 
In the case of the 11th ward where the remaining 9,000 or so 
blacks were moved to, the Alderman, Michael Bilandic, is unquestionably a 
machine alderman. In Daley's own ward, there is always a concerted ef-
fort to produce the best turnout and the greatest number of Democratic 
votes in the 11th ward. The black population of the 11th ward after this 
move was no more than twenty per cent--a percentage that sti 11 allowed 
for an overwhelming control by machine captains even in the event that 
blacks decided to vote against a machine candidate. The area that was 
incorporated into the 11th ward was already a black neighborhood (along 
the frontage of the Dan Ryan Expressway). This maneuver permitted the 
reapportioners to move the 14th ward two blocks farther south (as well as 
farther west with the aid of the 3rd ward maneuver). The resulting 
white majority in the 14th ward (over 36,000) would have been more than 
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enough to elect a white Daley alderman, thereby limiting the number of 
black wards and still keeping the machi.ne in power in that area. (They 
did elect Alderman Edward M. Burke, who also served as the Democratic 
Ward Committeeman). 
The maps on the following pages indicate the position of the 
14th ward (as well as the other three wards being examined) in both 
1960 and 1970. The third map in the group is an overlay of both years 
and graphically portrays the changes in ward boundaries. 
Another ward that fits somewhat into the pattern already estab-
lished in terms of gerrymandering in Chicago is the 19th ward. Situated 
in the southwestern most comer of the city, the 19th ward in 1960 
included all or part of Auburn-Gresham, Beverly, Morgan Park, Mount 
Greenwood and Washington Heights. 
Population shifts in this area for the past ten years have been 
quite significant. Auburn-Gresham was .2% black in 1960; by 1970 it had 
become 68.67% black. Washington Heights was 12.5% black in 1960; by 
1970 the black population had grown to 74.66%. From 1950 through 1970, 
Beverly and Mount Greenwood remained less than 1% black. Morgan Park on 
the other hand, experienced a change from 35% to 47% black population 
for the same period. 
From an economic standpoint, Beverly and Mount Greenwood (both 
of which are entirely in the 19th ward even today) are numbered among 
the top five communities in terms. of aver.age family income. The percen-
tages of families in these areas that are earning more than $10 ,000 
annually are 79.26% and 72.01% respectively. Both of these areas are 
7TH, 14TH, 19TH AND 31ST WARD BOUNDARIES: SEPTEMBER 28, 1961 
Source: Chicago 
Board of 
Election 
Cammi ssi one rs 
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predominantly Irish-Catholic, and nearly a quarter of the residents at-
tended four or more years of college. Only Hyde Park had a higher 
percentage of residents attending college for four or more years (perhaps 
related to the presence of the University of Chicago). 
In contrast~ the other three community areas have an average of 
8.60% of the residents attending four or more _years of college and 
62.35% make more than $10,000 annually. It was no wonder then, that 
after the new ward boundaries were drawn in 1970, the black population 
of the 19th ward was only 7,714 and this maneuver was accomplished by 
excluding all of Washington Heights and Auburn-Gresham. There can be no 
other possible explanation of this action than the one explained by 
gerrymandering; in effect, the removal of these two community areas from 
the 19th ward created two entirely 11 safe 11 wards for the Democratic Party 
while preserving the number of established black wards. This action 
gave the Democratic Party an 11 unfair advantage 11 in terms of ability to 
elect certain aldermen. The creation of the 11 unfair advantage 11 is 
directly in line with the very definition of gerrymandering that we 
examined in Chapter II. There are innumerable ways to redraw the 
boundaries of the 19th ward and still remain within the parameters of 
the "one man, one vote 11 concept, and yet, the one chosen happens to ex-
clude two black communities. One would be inclined to conclude that 
this was more than just chance or coincidence. 
The only way to·effectively_ accomplish this gerrymandering was 
to place the black population in a ward that would not affect the 
machine 1 s control in the area. The 34th ward, which originally was 
located on the Near North Side, was moved to the South Side, and the 
area around the 19th ward was redrawn to include this relocated ward. 
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The blacks that were removed from the 19th ward were placed in the 34th 
and 21st wards with the greater part of the land mass (about 75%) and 
the corresponding population placed in the 34th ward. The area that was 
covered by the 34th ward was already an all black area and under machine 
control. It was a matter of routine for the machine to elect black 
Alderman Wilson Frost. The election of Frost, president pro tern of the 
City Council and a key black leader in the machine, placed the entire 
area under complete machine domination. 
Had the machine not moved the blacks into the already black area 
that was to become the 34th ward, the black population of the 19th ward 
would have been 26,008. In effect then, the function served by the 
gerrymandering of the 19th ward was to keep the level of blacks at the 
1960 mark and contain them in one area (the 34th ward), thereby prevent-
ing them from possibly gaining two wards in terms of representation. 
Since the entire next chapter involves a detailed study of the 
Federal Court of Appeals' findings on the alleged gerrymandering of the 
31st ward, I will limit discussion of the ward to the data found in the 
1960 and 1970 census that pertains to the population of this area. As 
previously noted, the term I have given to the action of gerrymandering 
in the case of the 31st ward is "dispersal." It involves a conscious 
effort to 11 scatter11 a particular population (in a political sense) by 
dissecting the community's boundaries with ward boundaries. By separating 
the particular ethnic community into several different wards, it is 
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possible to keep any ethnic consciousness expressed through the ballot 
from resulting in the election of a representative of the ethnic group 
in question. 
Before the 1970 census, the 31st ward was primarily composed of 
Humboldt Park and West Town. The total Spanish-speaking population of 
the 31st ward in 1960 was 28,795.11 If the ward boundaries had remained 
the same, the 1970 Spanish-speaking population of the 31st ward would 
have numbered 60,022. However, after the 1970 redistricting, the present 
Spanish-speaking total is 22,022. (No conversion factor was necessary 
because the city of Chicago has published an up-to-date census of the 
Spanish-speaking in the city by ward.) 
The change in the ward boundaries in the 31st enabled the machine 
to limit the Spanish-speaking to approximately one-third of the total 
ward population. This effort, however, created the problem of where to 
place the remaining Latinos. The 26th ward is located directly South-
east of the 31st. The alderman is Stanley M. Zydlo, a Regular Democrat. 
In 1960, the Spanish-speaking represented 4.8% of the total population 
of the 26th ward .. In 1970 they were 32.5% of the ward's population--a 
politically non-important factor in the case of majority rule when faced 
with ethnic voting patterns). In 1960, the 32nd ward had a Spanish-
speaking population of 4.89% and the 33rd had only 0.22%. These wards 
11The figures for the Spanish-speaking community are not taken 
from the Local Community Fact Book as are all the figures for the black 
population. Rather, they are taken from an updated census made by the 
City of Chicago. Because they are listed by ward arid not community area 
as are the black population figures, the transformation from community 
to ward is unnecessary and therefore the conversion factor is not employed. 
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are represented by Terry M. Gabinski and Tex Sande, both of whom are 
members of the Regular Democratic Party. By 1970 the Spanish-speaking 
totals had grown to 25.5% and 18.6%, respectively. City-wide in the 
same ten-year period, the Spanish-speaking population of Chicago had 
increased 125%. And yet, in these three wards, the population increased 
anywhere from 800% to 900%. In the 33rd ward, the population went from 
156 Spanish-speaking to 12,483. 
Why was it advantageous to the machine's position to engineer a 
move of this nature, and more importantly, why move them to 26, 32 and 
33? The large concentration of Spanish-speaking in the area of the 31st 
ward endangered the re-election of one of the key members of the machine, 
Alderman Thomas Keane. (Keeping in mind the machine policy discussed 
in Chapters IV and the beginning of V, which involves appealing to a 
homogeneous community, the difficulty in Keane's ward was a result of 
the triforcation of the community--white ethnics, blacks and now 
latinos.) Even if this was not uppermost among the concerns of the 
mayor, it certainly would have been expected to bother Keane and as chief 
architect of the redistricting plan, he was in a position to do something 
about it. 
Why this particular maneuver occured becomes more apparent when 
viewed from the perspective of the entire redistricting that took place 
that year. Specifically, in terms of both the 19th ward and the 31st 
ward, the machine felt that a change was necessary. The problems were 
quite different. In 19 what was needed was an addi ti anal ward where the 
black population could be contained, while in 31 what was needed was the 
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correct number of wards which would allow the dissection of the Spanish-
speaking community to keep it from establishing a majority in any ward 
and thereby retaining machine control over the area. 
It appears that the answer to both of these problems was the 
34th ward. By removing it from the Northwest Side, the machine was able 
to take the remaining four ward (31, 26, 32 and 33--all of which are and 
were ma chine-dominated wards) and rearrange their boundaries so th at 
each one of these loyal machine wards received a portion of the potenti-
ally dangerous Latin community. The choice of these wards was logical 
in that they were all within a reasonable distance of the center of the 
Spanish-speaking community and were already machine-dominated. Besides 
the obvious advantage of moving the 34th ward to keep the 31st ward 
11 safe 11 , the maneuver also provided the addition al advantage of the pre-
viously discussed 19th ward maneuver. 
Obviously, there is no better ward to examine in detail at this 
point than the one that "belongs" to the man who redrew the ward bound-
aries in the city; the 31st ward of Alderman Thomas Keane. 12 
12The research for this analysis covers an era when Thomas Keane 
was alderman of the 31st ward. Since that time he was forced to give up 
his office after his conviction in federal court for mail fraud and 
comspiracy. In the 1975 Aldermanic Elections in Chicago, Thomas Keane's 
wife won the election and now represents the 31st ward. 
I'' 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
THE 31ST WARD: A CASE STUDY 
The main reason for the focus on the 31st ward involves Alderman 
Thomas Keane. If one assumes that gerrymandering is designed to aid a 
particular party or its members, the logical place to look for evidence 
of gerrymandering would be in those areas where the leading party mem-
bers enjoy control. As cited in Chapter II I of this paper, Thomas Keane 
has proven to be the second most influential man in the Democratic Party 
in Chicago (second only to Richard J. Daley). Thus, his home ward would 
be a logical beginning point for an investigation of this nature. 
One would expect that if gerrymandering were to take pl ace, 
certainly those responsible for the redistricting would have to be part 
of the gerrymandering effort. It is not unreasonable then, to examine 
the actions and impute possible motives for the manner in which ward 
boundaries were redrawn. Not only did Thomas Keane have the opportunity 
to affect a change of any nature he desired by virtue of his role as the 
Chairman of the special subcommittee commissioned to present a suitable 
reapportionment of the city, but he also possessed the political know-
ledge and contacts necessary to achieve a goal such as gerrymandering. 
A second reason for closer examination of the 31st ward involves 
the litigation that resulted from the alleged gerrymander. In the court 
battle that fol lowed the al legations of gerrymandering in the city, two 
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wards were central to the entire discussion: the 7th ward which was 
ordered redrawn on the grounds of gerrymandering {although it was later 
returned to its original boundaries after a series of appeals), and the 
31st ward which was not ordered redrawn at all. 
Before pursuing this line of thought with all its implications, 
it is necessary to examine the physical aspects of the ward and the 
population composition in order to understand the profitabi 1 ity of gerry-
manderi ng. 
On September 28th, 1961, a map containing the ward boundaries of 
the City of Chicago was entered into the municipal code along with the 
descriptions of the individual wards. The map was presumably based on 
the population changes noted by the 1960 United States Census data. Of 
particular interest to the people on the Northwest Side of the city were 
the new ward boundaries of the 31st ward. The alderman at this time was 
Thomas Keane.1 The ward that Keane represented since he was first elec-
ted in 1945 began at the intersection of Chicago and Western Avenues. 
It proceeded north on Western Avenue until it intersected with North 
Avenue, where it turned west. It continued west on North Avenue until 
Pulaski Road; turning south on Pulaski where it returned to Chicago Ave-
nue. The ward then continued east on Chicago until it returned to the 
point of origin. Obviously, the ward was a compact rectangle incorpora-
ting a fairly contiguous piece of property. 
lThis map resulted from the city ordinance adopted on September 
28th, 1961 as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 4-64. 
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On November 6th, 1970, a map containing the 11 new 112 ward bound-
aries of the City of Chicago followed the same filing process. Again, 
it was of parti cu1ar interest to the people on the Northwest Si de to 
note the proposed new boundaries of the 31st ward. Section 4-44 of the 
Municipal Code (amended) outlines these new boundaries. 
An examination of these two sets of boundaries (see maps on 
pages 55 and 56) leads to two observati ans. The first is that the re-
sulting western edge of the proposed new ward was seven blocks farther 
west than the corresponding boundary on the 1961 map. The second obser-
vation is that the eastern edge of the ward resembles a drain pipe in 
its new and contorted form, while the previous boundary formed a simple 
right angle. Perhaps at first there appears no need for further inves-
tigation. However, considering the new ward and its changed boundaries 
in light of census data which indicates an increase of Spanish-speaking 
at the eastern edge of the ward and a predominance of "white ethnics 11 3 
at the western edge (38.8% foreign stock in the community area, 93.2?; of 
whom live i.n the western one-third of the ward4), there is reason enough 
2The map that resulted from this ordinance was adopted by the 
Chicago City Council as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 4-
64 amended, November 6th, 1970. 
3The term "white ethnics" is used in the manner of Weber as he 
described this need for human collectivity based on an assumption of 
common origin, real or imaginary, Max Weber, The Ethnic Group, in Talcott 
Parsons, et al. Theories of Society, Vol. 1,p. 305 (Glencoe, Ill.: The 
Free Press, 1961) 
4All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the 
populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagwa and P. M. 
Hauser~ Local Community Fact Book (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 
1950, 1960, 1970) 
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to investigate this redrawing further. 
Humboldt Park (which is the community area corresponding to the 
western edge of the 31st ward) has approximately 15.5% Spanish-speaking 
while West Town (which is the eastern edge) has a Spanish-speaking popu-
lation of 39.09%. In 1960, two-thirds of the 31st ward was in West Town 
and only one-third in Humboldt Park. In 1970, however, the order was 
reversed and now two-thirds of the 31st ward's population lives in Hum-
boldt Park. 
Despite the increase in Spanish-speaking in West Town, the total 
population of the area decreased by ten per cent. The figures and maps 
illustrate one constant factor: in 1960 the Spanish-speaking were seven-
teen per cent of the total ward population; in 1970, there was a 
significant increase in this population. It was so significant that 
even after the ward was moved nearly a mile farther from the center of 
the Spanish-speaking community, it still comprised thirty-three per cent 
of the ward's population. Even without examining the registration rates 
and voting patterns of minorities, in_ numerical consideration alone, the 
Spanish-speaking remain a political minority in the 31st ward despite 
their growth in numbers in the general area. 
From an evaluation of census data and figures and maps supplied 
by the Department of Development and Planning of the City of Chicago, 
the approximate central point of the Spanish-speaking community lies at 
the intersection of Division and Western Avenues (see map on following 
page). Not only is a portion of the 31st ward's boundaries part of this 
intersection, but it also serves as part of the boundaries for three 
MAp1 _ 
MAjOR CONCENTRATiONS of spANisl-t-spEAkiNG iN 1960 & 1970 
(0W,.UNtfT Alt.A 
N.a-.it$ 
IOGt•t ta•1 
•Ill l•OC.r 
.... (01 .. 10 ...... 
•OU .. (f,.'I• 
...... ,. 
I ''""'COi"' •••• 
... , •• 110••· ,.,, 
• •oisc• •••• 
• •O•wooo •••• 
It jlltUIOll •It'll 
I IOttll OlOI 
,, "0''"" •••• 
........... 
•01UC.f tlH 
t tl•'"G ••t• 
' Dt1•llf•1tG 
t •O .. r<talf 
IOC.111 IO!ftll 
t •u~•OtD' •111 
•111 to• .. 
. •u111 .. 
I ..... GIH•llD h 
llU Gllf•hD 11 
.. u •• .,, ,.,. 
•O•h• ••• .. o•u 
IOV'"" 11• .. 0AU 
IO•U •U• loOt 
• 1001 
,.,,,sou•• l•Ot 
•••ou• 10,n11 
•0"0111 
01·111-.,-
IUllfl •ttl 
~··"'~ ll1tO 
...... .300 
... , ..... c.•o .. '" 
••Ot •111 
•0001••• 
IO•JI• l•CH 
, ....... . 
11.110 ..... . 
1011•• , ... r.oo 
C'llll•l1 W•?•ll 
IOU\IM. 
•vu••'t 
10·.11 ........... 
, . .,, .. ~··· 
.. fGIW•IC• 
O•ll•h• ltDOt 
llC•fl •l•G•fl 
tt•t.•fO" 1.111 
., .......... . 
111,.C.ttO .. 
•••c••• 
•u• 1u:110 .. 
C•OI "••• 
., ...... 0 
. ,,, , .. .. 
(to•~lllGO •••• 
•It' 1 .. 0ll•OOO 
t,.C.U•:IC'f 
OU•••• o••-:11 c• 
•t·•vt• Olft111a• 
..... ,, 
~., ..... oro .. 1110'1 
•Q\nlt O•ll••OOe 
O••U 
+ ~~i--· ;_ 
. . ........ . 
'-'---.................. ;~~~=--;_,,....;.--~ ..... __ .;_....;......J-~-l 
l 
-...... ! 
a•; : r 
. ~- . ~ .. : . ..: . 
... 
.. 
--~·"· :-· -~ 
-++·~ 
~~'~ •• t 
. : ... ~-·· ·:- -i--:---'-~---!--'--,..====~='--~.=:.r-... 
-·+·+-·i.·· 
.. ~ .• i. -
.. .. J 
:n 
. . . 
. -~-- ... :---~---!. 
. ·"··· : 
: '': : .. : .. ,. ; 
-.--:----:---· --:-· -:- --:-
-,. ---~. 
:21: 
. 
. . 
.......... 
n: 
. -,. ···-
. ~.~3: 
--·-~m;·--. 
.. : II r" ·•· 
·' : ... :: .. 
.... .., 
i. -: .. -.. -- .•.. 
:u: :": 
•• •r •• ·!" •.• . -:-· ... 
Cen1u1 troch with 25~ or more~-­
Sponith- 1peolting p.,1ona 
! 
.... i 
Sovru: U.S. Ccfts111. 1"4) '"' U10 
t:Ott~ (O"C.,.tritlo,..s lor l'"' NsN 
•"fit.I for •11 S:tt"'h"·':•et1,., 
P""IO"I. (~(f""lt.f'lttc."'"f fO"' 1~0 
k1H 0'1 4et1 fo• flrtt l,.J HC~ 
'"'""'ti°" ftnto1>s toti l\t~rto 110111 • 
: : 
---~::~r: f.1~t~~~~~----
. . 
tt??·'*·c-·. 
"'' .. -~·· 
. 
.. 
68 
other wards. The 34th ward, which was located in the same general area 
before and after the 1960 reapportionment, was moved to the South Side 
after the 1970 reapportionment and used to incorporate the black area 
surrounding the 19th ward. (See argument offered in Chapter V.) After 
the removal of the 34th ward, the expansion and reorganization of the 
remaining wards was possible. The remaining four wards were restructured 
in such a manner as to separate the Spanish-speaking into different 
political subdivisions, thereby keeping them from gathering in any one 
particular ward. 
This action, which I have termed "dispersal," is the opposite of 
the "confinement" action taken in the previously discussed wards. In 7, 
14 and 19 the object was to combine black areas and separate them from 
the white areas to facilitate the election or re-election of machine 
candidates. By sectioning off the black areas the machine was able to 
plan election strategy with a more homogeneous electorate in mind. In 
my estimation, this action was necessary because of the large numbers of 
people that had to be dealt with. In the case of the Spanish-speaking, 
their numbers do not warrant any action that would cause the machine to 
relinquish its power in the area and allow the election of a latin. Yet 
they do constitute a large enough group to cause possible election bat-
tles. The machine's response was to divide the community up into 
"controllable" numbers and separate it poli ti ca lly. 
The community at large had a response of its own. It came in 
the form of legal recourse. I have already stated that the judicial 
branch, on all levels, has taken the most definitive stand in terms of 
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dealing with gerrymandering, but because of the indeterminate nature of 
gerrymandering, it has been difficult to adjudicate the alleged practice. 
There was a particularly important case concerning gerrymandering in 
Chicago (i.e., the response of the community at large). The case deals 
with six specific instances of gerrymandering with reference to nearly a 
dozen more occurrences as well as a stated position dealing with the 
effect on the entire city. The center of the review is the 31st ward. 
Cousins v City Council of Chicaqo5 was brought to remedy alleged 
racial and ethnic gerrymandering in the reapportionment of Chicago's 
wards in 1970. The case was filed in December, 1970 and brought immedi-
ately to trial. At the conslusion of the first trial (in Chicago's 
Court), judgment was entered in favor of the defendants (The City 
Council, Mayor Richard J. Daley, and the Chicago Board of Election Cam-
mi ss i one rs). Subsequent to this decision, the p 1 ainti ffs--the Independent 
Voters of Illinois (a subsidiary group of the parent organization, Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, an organization engaged in political 
campaigning and fund raising for "independent-minded" candidates), 
Committee for an Effective City Council (an ad hoc committee organized 
by civic-minded citizens to prepare the charges against the defendants 
and to raise money for the court battles) and some twenty individuals--
appealed the ruling. After being notified of the court's decision to 
remand the case for retrial before a different judge, the defendants took 
recourse in filing for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs claimed that 
5cousins v City Council of Chicago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th cir. 
( 1971) I , I I 
I 
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citations in the filing were 11 clearly erroneous. 11 6 The United States 
Supreme Court denied petition for the writ. 
Subsequent to the Court's denial (which took place on May 25th, 
1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
the person of the Honorable Thomas R. McMillen, issued the Decision and 
Order7 finding only the 7th ward in the City of Chicago had been drawn 
so as to discriminate against a minority. To remedy the situation, he 
ordered the ward redrawn and a special election held. He failed to rule 
on the 31st or any other ward in question. 
According to a brief filed in the United States Court of Appeals 
by Michael Shakman, another attorney for the plaintiffs, the trial judge 
also found that the other wards had been drawn to exclude blacks and 
Puerto Ricans or to ensure a white majority, but McMi llen refused to 
order relief with respect to those wards because of a 11 misapprehension 
of the proper rule of law to apply to his own findings. 118 
The suit filed by these groups and individuals charged that the 
city had been gerrymandered in its entirety. (See discussion of 11 key 11 
wards' theory in Chapter V.) In lieu of the reapportionment of all of 
the city's wards, the plaintiffs submitted a number of intermediary steps 
they felt would remedy the most drastically gerrymandered wards. On 
61n a conversation with Alderman Dick Simpson in November of 
1973, Simpson (as a principle in the litigation), used the term 11 clearly 
erroneous 11 in relation to the grounds on which the defendants were fil-
ing for the Writ of Gerti orari. · 
7Appellate Court, 7th Cir., 446 F. 2d at 835 
p. 20 
8Plaintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, 
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August 10, 1973, the plaintiffs again filed a motion,9 this time for an 
injunction and an injunction pending appeal, in which they sought an 
order foreclosing the City Council from proceeding with its announced 
plans to reapportion all wards for the 1975 aldermanic and mayoral elec-
tions. The responsibility for this new apportioning of the ward 
boundaries would be placed in the hands of the same subcommittee that 
produced the currently contested reapportionment of 1970. This subcom-
mittee would undoubtedly be chaired by the same man who provoked most of 
the controversy surrounding the initial claim of gerrymandering, Alderman 
Thomas Keane. In November of 1974, the Circuit Court finally ruled in 
favor of the City Council and denied the motion for an injunction. 
The central character in the entire controversy appears to be 
Thomas Keane himself. During the course of the trial, evidence the 
plaintiffs submitted established the existence of what became known 
as the "Secret Map. u 10 Testimony was given concerning the preparation 
of a secret map in Alderman Keane's private law office, by a Keane aide 
and three college student interns paid by the city. This map was 
surreptitiously used by Alderman Keane as the basis for the official map 
he drew publicly at City Council Rules Committee meetings. According to 
Michael Shakman, " ••• the "Secret Map" and the discovery of its existence 
9Appellate, 310, 313 
10For a detailed discussion of the "Secret Map" see the 2nd 
Plaintiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal 
Appellate Court for the 7th Circuit. 
during the first trial was like an episode out of Perry Mason. 11 11 
The trial court found that in drawing the 31st ward on the 
11Secret Map, 11 Edward Bell (Keane's aide), 
..• resisted the inclusion of additional blacks or Puerto Ricans 
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in the new ward by keeping it as far west as was feasible. We 
believe·that this was resumabl · in accordance with Keane's WTsh.12 
Emphasis added. 
This quote from the Court's own decision seems evidence enough that 
gerrymandering for certain political reasons did in fact take place in 
the 31st ward. 
The plaintiffs went on to contend that since the actual 31st 
ward on the enacted map was identical with the one on the 11 Secret Map" 
there was no way for Keane to escape responsibility for what Edward Bell 
and the three college students had done. Furthermore, they felt be-
cause Keane was acting in an official capacity as agent of the City 
Council, the City Council must share the blarre for Keane's actions by 
virtue of their tacit approval. They substantiated their claim of the 
relationship between Bell and Keane with additional evidence including 
City Council records indicating that Edward Bell was paid by the city 
and had acted as agent for Alderman Keane in several official actions 
prior to this situation.13 
11This comment made by Michael Shakman appears in the 2nd Plain-
tiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal Appellate 
Court for the 7th Circuit, p. 11 
12Appellate ruling: App. #311 
13The argument offered by the defendants indicated that they were 
not contesting whether or not the actions were indeed politically moti-
vated but rather if the initiation came from Keane or Bell himself. 
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In response to the claim that the reapportionment of the 31st 
ward was a discriminatory exclusion of Puerto Ricans, the City Council 
argued that the change actually benefited the Spanish-speaking community 
by increasing their population in the 26th ward.14 (By the city's own 
figures, the per cent of the total population that was Spanish-speaking 
after the reapportionment was 33.0% for the 31st ward and 32.5% for the 
26th ward.) Despite the fact that the resulting populations of Spanish-
speaking in these two wards were practically identical, there is no 
evidence indicating that the Spanish-speaking population that was ex-
cluded from the 31st ward was transferred to the 26th ward as the city 
claimed. In fact, the evidence I presented in Chapter Vindicates that 
the Latinos were dispersed among three wards (26, 32, and 33). There 
was no testimony in any of the three court cases explaining that this 
11benefi ci ent gerrymander" was to help the Spanish-speaking constitute a 
majority or even a sizeable minority somewhere else. If indeed this was 
the object, the logical course would have been to gather them in the 
ward already containing the highest proportion of Spanish-speaking, that 
is, the 31st ward. The only mention of any such action by the City Coun-
14while in effect the Spanish-speaking population of the 26th 
ward was increased by the action taken by Keane, one must view the 
overall results of the action as a whole. The total population of 
Spanish-speaking in the 26th ward became over 32% as a result of the re-
districting; an overall increase of some 28%. However, all five wards 
in the immediate area with any noticeable Spanish-speaking population 
increased as a result of ethnic migration patterns. The ever present 
factor of no one ward with more than 33% Spanish-speaking is still vital 
to the consideration at hand. One can not ignore or blame coincidence 
for the fact that in a predominantly Spanish-speaking area of the city, 
the geo-political boundaries manage to dissect the community in such a 
manner as to develop five wards, none of which have close to a majority 
of Spanish-speaking. 
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cil was in the brief filed by the Council's attorneys in response to the 
appeal entered by the plaintiffs.15 The plaintiffs argued that the city's 
attorneys were making 11 ••• a blatant effort to concoct an after-the-fact 
justification for the unconstitutional discrimination practiced by the 
City Council and Alderman Keane. 11 16 The plaintiffs were granted an 
appeal in the case; once again the emphasis was almost entirely on the 
31st ward. 
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants in the first 
appeal based on the distinction between discrimination with respect to 
the larger community (the entire Spanish language group) and discrimina-
tion in terms of the particular (the Latin American minority). The 
court had ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to make a distinction 
between the two and therefore left the court with questionable juri sdi c-
ti on. In the Court's words: 
Furthermore, the evidence concerning the Spanish language group 
reveals that although totalling about 80,000 persons, it contains 
an unknown number of aliens and it is so scattered as to constitute 
a minority in any ward, unless perhaps a special ward were to be 
drawn to accommodate this group. We find and conclude that the 
plaintiffs evidence concerning the Spanish language group is not 
relevant to the pleadings or to the Court of Appeals mandate and in 
any event fails to prove grounds for relief.17 (Emphasis added.) 
There is legal precedent that questions the trial court's deci-
sion based on the point of citizenship. The 14th amendment prohibits 
15city of Chicago, Defendants Brief filed in response to cousins 
v City countil lt pp. 23-24 
p. 11 
16p1aintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Coosins ·v City·council, 
17Gornillion v Lightfoot; 466 F. 2d at 841 {1970) 
--
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discrimination against·petsons, it does not limit the scope of jurisdic-
tion to citizens.18 
In the first appeal the court denied relief because there was no 
basis for jurisdiction in a case of this nature. In the second appeal, 
the emphasis was placed on two different aspects. 
The star witnesses in one aspect of the second appeal were the 
three college student interns hired by the city and subsequently involved 
in drawing the 11 Secret Map 11 because of their assignment to Alderman 
Keane.19 In the brief filed by the plaintiffs for their second appeal, 
they claimed that to remedy the situation, it would be essential that an 
independent agency of some nature would have to assume responsibility 
for redrawing the ward boundaries. Part of the reasoning applied to 
this request (for the reapportionment function to be assigned to another 
agency) was the consideration that in the future, Keane and the City 
Council would not be foolish enough to hire college students who would 
so quickly divulge potentially damaging information. 
In response to the question of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs pre-
sented the opinion that the Court should use three rules of law in the 
decision and order on the claim of gerrymandering. The first rule stated 
lBsee, e.g., .Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) 
19In the briefs and trial transcripts the mention of the college 
students is listed as such: The three students and Professor Murray, 
their supervisor. The explanation I was given by a clerk in the Federal 
Building sounds plausible in that he stated that because of their youth 
and unintentional involvement perhaps their names have been stricken from 
the record. 
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that·minority group·mertters·are protected from having ward boundaries 
drawn to dilute or·minimize their voting strength; there should be no 
requirement that the minority constitute a majority of ward members be-
fore the gerrymander. In defense of this position they cited the case 
of Gomillion v Lightfoot: "When a legislature thus singles out a readily 
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treat-
ment (gerrymandering), it violates the fifteenth amendment. 11 20 
The second rule of law stated that to prove unlawful racial or 
ethnic discrimination, it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove 
that the dominant purpose of the defendants' action was discrimination. 
In Wright v the Council of the City of Emporia, the Supreme Court re-
cognized this principle. The Court of Appeals had found that the primary 
purpose of the city was beni-gn, and that it was not a cover-up for racial 
discrimination. But in the Wright case the Supreme Court had already 
rejected the dominant purpose theory by stating: 
This "dominant purpose" test finds no precedent in our decisions. 
It is true that where an action by school authorities is motivated 
by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the existence of that 
purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of the action by inten-
sifying the stigma of implied racial inferiority •.. it is difficult 
for the court to determine the "sole" or "dominant" motivation behind 
the choice of a group of legislators ••• thus we have focused on the 
effect and not on the purpose or motivation ••. the existence of a per-
missibl21purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible 
effect. (Emphasis added.) 
This Supreme Court decision appears to reject the position as-
sumed by the first trial judge when he claimed that Alderman Keane's 
(1972) 
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action was not intentional, and it was therefore permissible. 
The third rule of law that the plaintiffs felt was necessary to 
achieve proper adjudication in this case is that even if racial or eth-
ni t discrimination is the product of a variety·of rnotiviations~ it is 
unlawful. In reversing a lower court decision in the case of Smith v 
Adler Realty Company, the Supreme Court held: "it (race) cannot be 
brushed aside because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination 
nor the total factor of discrimination. We find no acceptable place in 
law for partial discrimination. 11 22 
These three rules of law offered by the plaintiffs were intended 
to be applied to the actions of the defendants. However, there was one 
defendant which claimed no part in the action whatsoever. The Chicago 
Board of Election Commissioners, in a brief filed by its attorney, 
Thomas Foran, contended that the board is charged with the administration 
of election laws concerning the aldermen in the City of Chicago and not 
with the way in which those laws come into being. Foran claimed " ... it 
is not the responsibility of the Board, under law, to determine the loca-
tion of the City's wards and their boundaries ••• as such, the Board is a 
neutral party ••• (and) ..• merely awaits the directions of the Court, if 
any. 1123 
In spite of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the case, 
22smith v Adler Realty·company, 436 F. 2d at 344 (1970) 
23Brief and Argument of Defendant Appel lee, Board of Election 
Commissioners of the City of Chicago in response to·cousirts·v·city 
council, p. 3 
.. 
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the Court refused to order remedy in the area of the 31st ward, and sub-
sequently, it remains the same as it was on the 11Secret Map. 11 The Court 
found that the action of the defendants was politically motiviated, yet 
no relief was granted because whether or not the gerrymander had taken 
place, the Spanish-speaking would not have managed a politically potent 
majority. Based on the logic presented by the Court in its decision, 
one would have to conclude that gerrymandering is an acceptable practice 
if the minority in question couldn't win an election whether the gerry-
mander took place or not. (Perhaps, under this same logic, euthanasia 
is legal as well as moral to the extent that whatever may be done, the 
patient will eventually die.) 
In its ruling the Appellate Court states: 
The ward (31st) ended up with 25% Puerto Ricans (not including other 
Spanish-speaking persons) and 1.4% blacks. Had it boundaries been 
moved east or north to include more blacks or Puerto Ricans, the 
dominant majority would still have remained overwhelmingly as before. 
We find and conclude that the consideration for the shape and bound-
aries of the 31st ward were primarily political and that the failure 
to include certain areas of blacks and Puerto Ricans caused them no 
discernible loss of voting strength.24 (Emphasis added.) 
These two considerations (where the emphasis is added in the 
Court's ruling above) conflict with the precedent set by the Supreme 
Court concerning the 11 dominant purpose" test (as discussed earlier in 
this chapter). The focus, as the Court stated, should be placed on the 
action taken, that is that the consideration for the shape of the ward 
was indeed "primarily political." The Appellate Court's decision was 
questionable in this regard: if the ward boundaries were moved seven 
24oecision and Order of July 11, 1973, Appellate Court Ruling, 
App. 310-311 
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blocks east instead of seven blocks west~ the Spanish-speaking popula-
tion of the 31st ward would have been 39.6%, and the black population 
would have been 4.5%. Because the court was compelled to combine these 
two ethnic groups to form one minority factor, I feel equally compelled 
and submit that when they are combined and measure 44.1% of the total 
population that this figure is indeed quite discernible from the 26.4% 
that results from the Keane redistricting. Considering the 31st ward 
in light of the "dominant purpose" theory as well as the results of the 
minority movement (an action apparently not taken by the appellate 
court), the conclusion becomes an obvious one. 
The evidence clearly points to the consideration that the 31st 
ward was indeed gerrymandered for "primarily political 11 reasons. The 
Court's decision does not reflect this evidence and in itself may re-
flect a "political influence" of another sort. At best, we can only 
speculate on this point. Regardless of the Court's reasons for ruling 
in favor of the defendants, it remains to be seen whether or not future 
cases of gerrymandering wil 1 test the fiber of our legal system. In 
any case, it is our social system that experiences the brunt of this 
kind of activity. The consequences of gerrymandering borne of primarily 
political ends certainly have great social implications, a subject to 
which we will now turn. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONSEQUENCES OF A GERRYMANDER 
How successful was the attempt at limiting the political power 
of the Spanish-speaking and black minorities in Chicago? As with most 
questions of this nature, the answer depends on one's perspective. 
While both sides of this confrontation may have reason to celebrate, it 
is clear that the anti-gerrymandering forces have felt the full force 
of Chicago's "machine power. 11 
There is one aspect of the entire debate that is obvious because 
of its absence. It was not the Spanish-speaking or black communities 
per se that engaged the battle with the machine; rather, it was the so-
cal led independent influence in Chicago that again challenged the machine. 
One is faced with the realization that, until these communities begin to 
organize and develop a mode of participation, any question of fair and 
equitable representation may be purely academic. One cannot assume that 
electing black or Latin representatives in Chicago is going to cure the 
ills of their communities, but from a practical political approach, it 
would give them that a 11 important foot in the door. 
The purpose of these past pages has been to acquaint the reader 
with the relevant information concerning gerrymandering and its differ-
ent forms and different manifestations in Chicago. The data and 
explanations so far supplied have only identified the nature of the pro-
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blem and its relation to the source of power in Chicago. To fully com-
prehend the implications of a political and social action like gerryman-
dering, the action must be considered in light of its relationship to 
the source of power that it depends on for its existence. That is to 
say, without the power of the machine in Chicago, gerrymandering would 
not be possible to the extent I have described. While the ability to 
gerrymander appears dependent on holding political power, the converse 
is not necessarily true. We have to take this concept one step further 
and ask two questions about the machine's power even without the aid of 
gerrymandering. First, if the ward boundaries had been drawn in compli-
ance with Baker v Carr, would there be any assurance that these 
mi nori ti es would or could elect their own representatives to the Chicago 
City Council? Second, would the election of one or two or even five 
representatives damage the machine's power? 
In ans\·1er to this first question, it is inequitable to deal with 
the very nature of representation on a 11 what if 11 basis. Certainly what 
we are concerned with is the opportunity and not assurances. It is in 
the guarantee of minority rights that the fundamental elements of Ameri-
can democracy are embedded. The XIII, XIV, XV, XXIV and perhaps soon 
the XXVII amendments hav~ repeatedly recalled the rights of the individual 
to his or her vote in our democracy. Nowhere in the Constitution of the 
United States, or for that matter in any interpretation of it, is there 
a passage that specifically assures that minorities will have a voice in 
government by virtue of their right to vote. They too have the right to 
cast their vote where they see fit, even though it may not be for a 
--
minority representative. The question remains, however, not who they 
may vote for, but rather who are they kept from voting for? 
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With the first question restated in this manner we are logically 
confronted with the second question: Would the election of a handful of 
minority representatives to the Chicago City Council endanger the con-
trol that the machine now enjoys? If gerrymandering in Chicago takes 
away the minorities' ability to vote for a particular person, and if 
this is accomplished by the machine's direct intervention, then the 
minorities in Chicago are being denied the rights guaranteed by law and 
tested in the courts. 
It may appear as if the use of gerrymandering in Chicago is the 
sole element of the machine's power. I doubt that an end to gerryman-
dering and the reapportionment of the wards in line with Baker v Carr 
would cause the machine to crumble immediately. However, without the 
ability to gerrymander in order to protect the re-election efforts of 
certain machine aldermen, the effectiveness of the machine could be 
severely hampered. The role that gerrymandering plays as an important 
tool for the maintenance and enhancement of the machine in Chicago could 
not easily be replaced. Even beyond this question of the machine's 
future one must ask if the use of gerrymandering does affect the quality 
(and perhaps the very existence) of minority representation in Chicago, 
and what are the consequences of this use in terms of the machine's 
desire for preservation and enhancement? 
In light of the !W_ of questions that need be asked (i.e., ques-
tions that deal with consequences primarily of social significance), the 
--
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most advantageous way of examining these questions is through a process 
that will scrutinize their social implications. Functional analysis, 
which was at one time primarily a technique employed in anthropological 
research of social and cultural differences, has been adapted by social 
scientists like Mertonl to establish the social consequences of actions 
in terms of their relationship to the system attempting to implement 
them. 
In Robert K. Merton's development of the conceptual scheme of 
functional analysis, he presents four concepts that are fundamental to 
an approach of this nature. 2 The first involves an awareness of the 
function that a social action serves. The second consideration involves 
an awareness of the process through which this function is eventually 
realized. The third aspect of the conceptual scheme lies in the direc-
tion of the unanticipated consequences of a social action, and the 
fourth consideration is of "those observed consequences which lessen the 
adaptation or adjustment of the system. 11 3 The dysfunction that Merton 
speaks of in his fourth consideration may lead to interference with the 
system's accomplishments or may lead to an eventual structural change 
of the sys tern. 
In Peter M •. Blau's study of bureaucracy4 he organizes his data 
lRobert K. Merton~ Sotial Theory and·sotial ·structure (reved.; 
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp_. 19-84 
2Ibid. 
3Ibi d. 
4Peter M. Bl au~· The Dyrtami ts ·of Bureaucracy ( reved.; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963) 
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along the paradigm developed by Merton. Blau defines function as an ob-
served consequence of social patterns.5 The social patterns that we 
are dealing with in this analysis of gerrymandering are heavily imbued 
with the influence of a definite machine-dominated political system. 
There is no doubt then that the consequences of social patterns so im-
bued would be an effort to maintain and/or enhance this machine-
dominated system. In keeping with Merton's paradigm and Blau's appli-
cation, the consequences realized through these social patterns are 
observable in terms of both their 11 manifest 11 (the designed outcome of 
social action) and their 11 1 atent 11 (unintended consequences of a social 
action) natures. 
One of the major manifest consequences realized through gerry-
mandering involves the previously discussed methods of enacting a gerry-
mander in Chicago. The containment and dispersal strategies the machine 
employs permit it to organize the composition of the electorate in the 
city's wards in such a fashion as to create 11 safe 11 districts for the re-
election of machine aldermen (see Chapter V). 
By this same process, limiting the number of 11 minority 11 and/or 
11 independent 11 aldermen who could possibly challenge machine control could 
be achieved. Both of these intended consequences involve an effort to 
quantitatively destroy the vote power of these minorities. Through this 
effort another consequence, which may or may not be the intended object 
of the machine, must be examined. I refer here to the racial overtones 
Speter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (reved.; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963) 
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of gerrymandering. Because the reapportionment was conducted in 11 closed 
session, 11 one can only impute possible racial motivations behind the re-
apportionment described in Chapter V and VI of this study. Three 
distinct possibilities are left. First the machine's action was one 
borne of racial prejudice. This line of reasoning is altogether too ex-
treme in reference to this aspect of political life in Chicago. Although 
many political actions are spawned of intense hatred for a particular 
ethnic or racial group, there is no empirical evidence to prove that 
gerrymandering was a result of this. A second possibility is that blacks 
and lattnos were identified by the machine as potential challengers and 
as such were 11 dealt with 11 as all other challengers have been (e.g. reform 
clubs and Independents). While this approach seems more in line with 
the past performance of the machine, one cannot entirely rule out the 
possibility of killing two birds with one stone. Which presents the 
third possibility, that these two approaches were the impetus for the 
gerrymandering in Chicago. While the main reason behind gerrymandering 
in Chicago was indeed political, it would be unrealistic to assume that 
gerrymandering did not involve certain racial overtones. One must keep 
in mind that New York successfully gerrymandered the Democrats out of 
the 15th district, regardless of race or ethnic origin, and Chicago's 
gerrymander did single out two readily identifiable ethnic groups. 
In examining the manifest consequences of gerrymandering {pri-
rnari ly the creation of 11safe 11 wards), the effects in terms of political 
power at the ward level should be noted. 
An analysis of the 1970 ward map i.ndi cates that there are fifteen 
---
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wards which contain a mixture of both black and white constituents. 
These wards lie on the border between the.all black areas of the city 
and the all white areas. There are eleven of these "border" wards where 
b 1 acks are in a minority and only four "border" wards where whites are 
in a minority. 
The number of blacks who would be placed in a minority position 
in these eleven wards totals 151,628. The number of whites in a corres-
ponding position would be 43,359, a difference of over one hundred 
thousand people who are placed in a relatively powerless position because 
this benefits the election of more readily "controlled" candidates. 
Scattering the Spanish-speaking as described in the previous chapter (in 
terms of political location) produced similar results. 
By separating the Spanish-speaking into different wards, the 
first consequence of the action of gerrymandering (i.e., the creation of 
11 safe 11 wards) is realized; even if they wished to vote against a machine 
candidate they are numerically insufficient to elect their own represent-
ative. (See discussion in Chapter V.) The action of gerrymandering 
quantitatively defines the electoral power of the Spanish-speaking after 
the fact, for while they may be gathered in great numbers in tenns of 
their community location, they are scattered politically in terms of 
their ward location. 
Another direct consequence of gerrymandering!> which may very well 
be a product of the production of safe wards, involves minimizing poten-
tial opposition. It stands to reason that for every safe ward produced 
as a result of gerrymandering there exists one less ward with the paten-
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tial to produce an anti-machine representative. In the examination of 
the four wards in this study there were an additional eight wards con-
sidered because of their role as recipient of the 11 displaced 11 populations. 
Seven of these eight wards are traditionally machine dominated (the 
exception being the 5th ward). After the populations were placed in 
these seven wards, the election results indicated that they remained 
machine dominated. At no time did the populations moved into these seven 
wards constitute greater than one-third of the ward 1 s total population. 
By limiting the opportunity for opposing groups to constitute a majority 
in any of these seven wards, the machine has continued its domination in 
those areas. 
These manifest consequences are obvious. Where the possibility 
of a loss of machine control existed, the policy of gerrymandering was 
employed to aid in strengthening this control. In the case of the all 
black areas, the wards were structured in such a way as to limit the 
number of possible minority aldermen by placing blacks in a minority 
position in the eleven border wards. 
Since election results for these wards indicate continued 
machine dominance, there is evidence that gerrymandering did achieve 
the goals the machine appeared to have set. However, because one cannot 
conclude that these candidates would have lost if the gerrymandering had 
never taken place, the·extent of the role of gerrymandering is somewhat 
ill-defined. While gerrymanderi_ng may appear to be a necessary cause 
for continued machine dominance, it can in no way be construed as a 
sufficient cause. 
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While the manifest consequences of this social action of gerry-
mandering appear to flow, one from the other, the latent consequences 
seem to be somewhat antithetical to each other (at least in terms of 
their effect on the machine's power). Because gerrymandering has all 
but closed the elective input channels, minority groups are forced to 
seek relief in other areas. Possible relief for the desire for repre-
sentation can be vented in appointive positions. The machine certainly 
did not intend to create the demand for these appointive positions; it 
was not its intention to force the resurgence of ethnic consciousness 
that spearheaded these demands. 
Once the Spanish-speaking were locked out of elective positions 
because of their minority position in Chicago's wards, they were forced to 
seek alternative methods. There remains a great deal of question regard-
ing the role the machine actually played in the success of this alterna-
tive venture. Perhaps it was only coincident to closing the elective 
channels, but nonetheless, the Mayor simultaneously began appointing a 
number of Spanish-speaking individuals to fill administrative positions. 6 
Key to the question of the Mayor's motivation in appointing 
Spanish-surnamed individuals is the machine's track record in other areas 
of federal pressure. Currently, the federal government brought litigation 
to force the City of Chicago to hire policemen on a quota system. In 
response to this pressure, the city originally refused to comply with 
61n a conversation with Ruben Cruz on April 26, 1976, columnist for 
the Chicago Sun-Times, the question of these appointments was raised. It 
is his opinion, as a leader in the Latin Community, that in the last five 
or six years Mayor Daley has succumbed to pressure by the Spanish-speaking 
community by appointing members to key positions in the city. These im-
pressions, while supported by other Latin leaders, have not been substan-
tiated by any other empirical data. · 
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the federal government's order, prompting the government to withhold 
federal revenue sharing funds. 7 The city has filed four appeals in the 
case and continues to battle the federal government's decision to this day. 
Obviously, the city has not succumbed to federal government 
pressure in this area of minority hiring, so ti does not seem logical to 
assume that in an area that does not have the millions of dollars at 
stake (as does police hiring), that the city would give in to less pres-
sure. 
In an across-the-board analysis of minority hiring in government, 
5.4% of the Spanish speaking in the United States are in government 
service of some nature. 8 Among the six major urban centers with a sub-
stantial Spanish-speaking population, only Miami has fewer Spanish-
speaking in government than Chicago. These statistics reflect the highly 
limited role that the Spanish-speaking played in Chicago's city govern-
ment, until five years ago when they became "conspicuously absent" (in 
relation to the national picture) from government or government-related 
positions. 
What is the significance of this point in time? Obviously, 
gerrymandering is not a recent phenomenon, and certainly not a product 
of the last three years. Why then, if not in response to federal govern-
ment pressure, did the Mayor begin these appointments? A possible 
?united States of America, et al v City of Chica o, 73c 2080 
(and consolidated cases 1975 
Bchicago Spanish-speaking Population: Selected Statistics, City 
of Chicago Department of Development and Planning, September, 1973. 
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explanation might be that with the most recent redistricting (and as 
demonstrated in Chapter VI, the most blatant anti-Latin gerrymandering) 
and the futile attempt of the Spanish-speaking community to elect Luis 
Davila to the Illinois House of Representatives, the machine attempted 
to fulfill its distributive policies by giving the Spanish-speaking a 
share of the pie. The most recent census figures indicated in terms of 
sheer numbers, the Spanish-speaking corrununity had to be reckoned with. 
This first 1 atent consequence was a manifestation of ethnic 
consciousness through the demand for recognition and representation. 
Another possible latent consequence of the informal policy of gerryman-
dering may involve an action similar to other machine policies: in the 
attempt to organize the black areas of the city into a limited number 
of wards, the unintended effect of stabilizing the community and con-
taining black migration may have been realized. The political signifi-
cance of this limiting of wards (discussed in Chapter V) through 
containing black migration is that the "containment policy" itself pro-
duced two effects: the first, the limiting of the number of black wards; 
the second, achievement of racial 11 stability. 11 
The effectiveness of gerrymandering in terms of racial "stabili-
ty" (in the physical sense of the ward) is not empirically demonstratable. 
However, there are certain factors, through functional analysis, that may 
lead one to believe that_ gerrymandering does play a definite role in 
shapi_ng this stability. 
From 1960 through 1970, the black population in the city of 
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Chicago increased by 150%. 9 During this same period the percentage of 
people living in all white neighborhoods decreased by only t111enty-one 
per cent. These figures indicate the relative immobility of the black 
" 
population. For the most part, it expanded in neighborhoods that were 
already black and still remain black at this time. 10 
There are certain actions that contribute to this {either by 
intent or result) control of the black minorities. Low and moderate in-
come and public housing facilities are almost exclusively built in black 
areas in Chicago, ll and gerrymandering ward boundaries creates the geo-
graphic parameters of these areas. Because the available housing is 
only available in already established black areas, the majority of blacks 
are forced to roove into these sections rather than elsewhere in the city. 
Construction of highways and urban renewal projects tend to 
create physical barriers that stem the movement of families from one 
section of the city to another. This is another instance where the in-
fluence of gerrymandering can be witnessed. It is common practice to 
draw ward boundaries along present physical barriers which in turn 
reinforce the distinctions that already exist between racial and ethnic 
groups. This practice enables redistrictors to place highways, railroads 
and natural elements in the path of demographic movement. 
9E. M. Kitagwa and P. M. Hauser, Local Community Fact Book 
(Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960, 1970) 
lODavid Protess, 11 Banfield 1 s Chicago Revisited, 11 Social Service 
Review {June, 1974) 
llGautreaux v CHA, 296 F. Sup. 907 {North Dist., Ill. 1969) 
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Under this closer scrutiny, what appeared to be a latent conse-
quence of gerrymandering begins to take on the proportions of a manifest 
consequence. The most profound element of the latent aspects of this 
consequence paradoxically seem to be the basis for the claim of their 
manifest nature. Specifically, I am referring to the question of 
stability. While it would appear that one could not guarantee that 
population movement would remain stable as a result of informal policy, 
the machine has been able to couple this policy with others in an 
attempt to achieve a guarantee of this nature. In effect then, what 
originally was a latent consequence--the apparent stability of blacks 
resulting from gerrymandering ward boundaries in Chicago--has been adopted 
by the machine and turned into a "desirable" or manifest action of gerry-
mandering (i.e., the combination of informal policies that lead to the 
physical stability of blacks in Chicago). 
Some of these informal policies grow out of the experiences noted 
in a changing neighborhood. Among those who move may be members of the 
machine who serve as precinct captains or in other capacities as machine 
members. If one is in the practice of receiving and granting favors from 
a select group (such as the role that a machine captain plays), the 
transformation from one ward organization to another may result in for-
feiting certain perquisites previously granted. These material induce-
ments may be sufficient to encourage a person to look for another home 
in the same ward. Even in the case where a person is not induced to move 
because of the socio-psychological impact of a changing neighborhood, the 
same influences may come to bear. 
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If a gerrymandered ward outlines a particular ethnic or racial 
community, and the inhabitants are induced by their role in the machine 
to remain in that community, then the continued outlining of that com-
munity (through gerrymandering) may well mean the continued stability 
of the community (in terms of the physical aspects). 
In the drawing of ward boundaries to create all black wards, such 
as the case of the 34th ward, machine domination may be viewed as prefer-
able by the constituents. In this case, it would be in the best 
interests of those who share a preferred position with the machine to 
remain in the ward. By creating all black and all white wards, the 
machine may be establishing added incentive for the black population in 
Chicago to remain stable. The political ramifications of this incentive 
will most probably be noted in terms of electoral response. 
The white community's response could be favorable electorally in 
return for keeping the black population 11 in its place. 11 12 In this role 
the machine would be seen as a 11 protector11 by the white community. For 
the black community, the illusion of strength through numbers and physi-
cal proximity could result from this informal policy. The separation of 
the races, in conjunction with material inducements for remaining within 
a predefined geo-political distinction (which is largely the result of 
gerrymandering) could be viewed as sufficient cause for the black popu-
1 ation remainfog somewhat stable. Thi.s is not to say that the elements 
previously discussed (housi.ng~ physical barriers) do not play an impor-
12oavi d Protess ~ 11 Banfield 1 s Chicago Re vi sited,"· Sod al Service 
Review (June, 1974) 
tant part; but rather that the stability factor as a latent-turned-
manifest consequence of gerrymandering supplies the necessary final 
ingredient to make the entire package palatable. 
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Amidst all of these consequences lies the realization that the 
multi-ethnic population of Chicago has resisted the "melting pot" 
tendencies of cities with smaller and less diverse ethnic makeups. This 
resistance only made the role of the gerrymanderer more important in the 
eyes of the Regular Democratic Organization's leadership. As long as 
ethnic differences are pronounced, it wi 11 be necessary for can di dates 
to appeal to a wide range of groups. Elections will depend upon the 
effectiveness of the coalitions that form in favor of a particular 
candidate and it will remain in the machine's interest to divide these 
groups up into single entities to facilitate logrolling efforts by 
initiating a specific appeal intended for a specific group. As long as 
it is politically more desirable to separate these groups than to com-
bine them, gerrymandering will be an important tool for machine mainte-
nance. 
. . 
CHAPTER VI II 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The element that lies at the very base of this analysis is the 
definition of a machine as a political party with a virtual monopoly 
over political resources which distributes tangible incentives for 
votes. 1 It is from this definition that the entire study developed and 
the role of gerrymandering was examined. I think at this juncture we 
can make some very important statements based on what has been thus far 
examined. Gerrymandering of itself does not make the Chicago machine a 
"machine." Neither do patronage or ward as opposed to at-large elec-
tions. Mayor Daley's ability to combine the roles of mayor and party 
chairman has not made the machine what it is. At least none of these 
aspects has accomplished this on its own; each factor has contributed 
to the continued success of the machine in Chicago. Each has indicated 
the presence of a machine in Chicago, and their perpetuation will most 
likely insure the machine's continuance. 
In a behaviorial analysis that examines one of these aspects in 
particular (i.e., gerrymandering}, there should be some quantitative esti-
mation of what impact the particular has had on the other aspects of 
machine dominance. 
1Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson~ ·city Politics (New York: 
Random House,. 1966) p. 115 
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The importance of gerrymandering among all the other indicators 
of machine power lies in its accessibility and relative ease of imple-
mentation under machine dominance. This is not to say that reform 
cities do not gerrymander, but rather the conditions that exist in a 
machine city allow the existing power structure to accomplish control 
of minorities with relatively little fear of reprisal. 
This element has initiated a self-perpetuating cycle in machine-
dominated Chicago. To gerrymander effectively, it becomes almost 
essential to have machine-type control. To continue this machine con-
trol, the electorate must re-elect machine members. A very effective 
way of achieving this control is through gerrymandering. 
This concept stands at the center of the entire discussion of 
the role of gerrymandering. In the text of this analysis we have estab-
lished the use of gerrymandering, its social as well as political 
consequences and the correlation between its future existence and that 
of the Chicago machine. What of the extent of this correlation? The 
answer to this is undeniably linked with the role of gerrymandering in 
the methods used for ensuring re-election. 
The first premise is tau to l ogi cal: 
to the continued existence of the machine. 
re-election is fundamental 
The second premise is that 
the primary mode for accomplishing this objective is through the control 
of the apparatus of election; that is to say, the use of specific tech-
niques {tools as it were) to ensure machine maintenance. If re-election 
{the first premise) is achieved through control of the electoral apparatus 
(the second premise) then the object, machine maintenance, will be 
realized. 
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One way to measure the extent of this association is to examine 
the process (the method of controlling the electorate), in terms of the 
influence of gerrymandering. The role of the machine precinct captain 
in shaping the electoral habits of the citizenry has been documented in 
numerous accounts. 2 The control captain's exhibit is heightened by a 
variety of perquisites that enable them, as machine captains, to accom-
plish much more than their counterparts in reform cities (at least to 
the extent that reform captains do not enjoy a virtual monopoly over 
resources, and this allows for more viable competition by other parties 
and their captains). 
This type of control over the electorate is best accomplished 
when stability (in terms of demographic movement) is achieved on the 
ward and even on the precinct level. While the ward is a political 
distinction and in and of itself has no physically limiting characteris-
tics, the influence exerted by ward officials and the attempt to maintain 
11 face to face contacts with individual citizens 113 allows the machine to 
11 keep its grip upon the voters. 114 What better way to keep this 11 grip 11 
than to ensure a stable population by devising methods to keep it under 
the control of the same individuals? Gerrymandering, while separating 
2Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 23 
3Ibid. p. 23 
4Ibid. p. 23 
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these groups from other groups also serves to keep them in approximately 
the same area, thereby continually placing them under the control of the 
same ward officials. 
The traditional control of the black areas that Gosnell attri-
butes to the success of the first Daley mayoral election is not the same 
tradition that affects the Spanish-speaking in Chicago. Without this 
tradition of machine control, the orientation toward the Spanish-speaking 
community (as exemplified by the study of the 31st ward) differs from 
that used in the black areas inasmuch as it requires the dispersal 
tactics previously discussed. The effectiveness of this policy lies in 
the successful scattering of the Spanish-speaking into four wards and 
thereby preventing them from attaining the sheer numbers necessary for 
rivaling the machine's power. 
Both of these orientations significantly contribute to the 
success of machine-style politics in Chicago. It is vital to the under-
standing of the methods employed by the machine that one places the 
entire scheme in perspective. The Chicago machine's ability to gerry-
mander comes from its control over political resources (patronage and 
other perquisites), its unrivaled elections (for the most part), the com-
bination of the roles of mayor and party chairman, and the allegiance of 
the non-white community. Each one of these aspects of machine power is 
directly linked with the machine's ability to control the minorities--
·which ·has been largely the result of gerrymandering. In other words, 
while gerrymandering could not be effectively implemented without the 
aid of the machine, the machine in Chic.ago would have only limited 
effectiveness without gerrymandering. 
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